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ABSTRACT 
This paper examines the ways in which legalism in human rights work is limited. Building on 
this assertion, with the support of various scholars, the paper explores one non legal human 
rights methodology—socially engaged art—to expand on alternatives to human rights legalism. 
Through an engagement with political theory, sociological scholarship, and critical art theory, 
several questions are raised: 1) How is legalism in human rights inadequate or limited? And 2) In 
what ways can socially engaged art challenge human rights legalism and offer a supplement to 
legalistic human rights work? In an effort to understand the limitations of human rights legalism, 
and the radical potential of non legal human rights projects, four socially engaged art case studies 
are analyzed: Gramsci Monument by Thomas Hirschhorn, Flint Fit by Mel Chin and Tracy 
Reese, School of Panamerican Unrest by Pablo Helguera, and Good Fences Make Good Neigh-
bors by Ai Weiwei. Each study reveals new ways of understanding human rights subjectivities, 
the politicizing capacity of collective participation, and the unique possibilities for human rights 
futures which are offered by non legal projects. 
!  of !2 90
Table of Contents 
Section I: Introduction………………………………………………………..…p. 3 
Section II: Literature Review………………………………………………..…p. 12 
Section III: Case Studies and Analysis…………………………………………p. 25 
 Gramsci Monument………………………………………………..….…p. 33 
 Flint Fit………………………………………………..………..….……p. 47 
 School of Panamerican Unrest………………………………………..…p. 57 
 Good Fences Make Good Neighbors………………………………..…..p. 68 
Section IV: Conclusions………………………………………………………..p. 78 
List of Figures:………………………………………………………………….p. 85 
Bibliography:……………………………………………….…………………..p. 86 
!  of !3 90
I. SECTION ONE 
INTRODUCTION: RELEVANCE, MOTIVATION, OBJECTIVE 
Intro 
 Human rights activists have historically utilized various legal tools such as amicus briefs, 
constitutions, and international jurisprudence in order to advance the protection and promotion of 
human rights globally. “International Human Rights Law” remains a staple in many blossoming 
graduate programs in human rights studies. Yet, the justiciability of universal human rights re-
mains debated, and many legal tools and structures for advancing human rights are insufficient 
for people around the world. This research stems from the recognition of this issue in the human 
rights corpus: an innate preference for legal mechanisms for change and a subordination of vari-
ous non-legal human rights projects which may in fact be more accessible and legible to human 
rights subjects. I seek to understand the ways in which legalism operates to structure power with-
in human rights projects and what non-legal human rights projects such as socially engaged art 
can reveal about the current flaws of human rights legalism.   
 I argue that the effects of legal biases—which I define as “legalism” in this paper— in 
human rights discourses are limiting for victims of human rights abuses.  Although possessing 1
human rights by law in itself is not detrimental to rights-holders (rather, it is a positive step for 
the enforcement of rights), the legalism which surrounds human rights, I argue, makes inaccessi-
ble the discourses and work which human rights subjects should, ideally, be participants in. Be-
 Although Brown and Halley (2009), Wendy Brown (1995), Angela Harris (1990) and others use rights 1
legalism as inherently intertwined with liberalism and modernity—Harris attributes this to the fact that 
“modern legal theory relies on the ‘separation thesis,’ the claim that human beings are distinct individuals 
first and form relationships later.” (603)—in this paper I primarily use the term “legalism” to signify the 
overwhelming bias for legal methods in the protection and advancement in human rights.
!  of !4 90
cause of this obstacle, which comes from legal approaches and methods in human rights exclu-
sively available to a governing group (for whom legalism is actually useful), I investigate one 
possible alternative for accessing and participating in human rights work.  Specifically, I analyze 2
socially engaged art as a catalyst for human rights discourses and participating in human rights 
change. In many ways, socially engaged art contrasts with the aims and outcomes of laws: where 
legal methods mobilize technologies of power which are individualizing, exclusive, and repro-
duce political order, socially engaged art can be collective, egalitarian, and challenges political 
structures.  I derive all of these assertions from art theorists, philosophers, and political scientists 3
to perceive socially engaged art both as an artistic project and, in certain cases, as a non-legal 
human rights project.  
 Due to the interdisciplinary nature of human rights studies, this project operates at the 
intersections of political philosophy, law, and art. Rather than work under a thematic focus within 
human rights studies, I focus on the implications of law as the dominant methodology in human 
rights work for advocacy and protection of rights. My definition of “human rights work” is in-
formed by multiple disciplines and can be summarized by a statement from the Center for Evalu-
ation Innovation: 
 Human rights work is organized around fundamental principles that all humans should   
 have access to basic rights and is focused on protecting and promoting those rights. These 
 Here, I am referring to Brown’s and Halley’s (2009) understanding of governance legalism, a process 2
which utilizes technologies of power to perpetuate legal formalism and reproduce “the state,” or the gov-
erning group (p. 10). 
 Wendy Brown (2009), Janet Halley (2009), and Samera Esmeir (2016) are a few of the theorists I utilize 3
who write on the dominance of legalism and the outcomes of this. Claire Bishop (2012) and Grant Kester 
(2011) are theorists of socially engaged art who assert and complicate these ideas, while Judith Butler 
explores the ways in which collectivity challenges current political order in Notes Toward a Performative 
Theory of Assembly (2018). It is important to note that scholars such as Claire Bishop (2012) also prob-
lematize the idea of socially engaged art as inherently collective or egalitarian. 
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 principles, which are set out in the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, are   
 backed by numerous international human rights conventions, declarations, and    
 resolutions…The work itself is multi-disciplinary and can include a broad range of   
 related activities, such as public education, training judges and lawyers, providing legal   
 defense to political prisoners, policy advocacy, and researching and documenting human   
 rights issues.  4
Although Schlangen notes that “human rights work” is multi-disciplinary, human rights is, ulti-
mately, a body of law.  5
 I argue that this prioritization of legal tools such as reports, trials, constitutions, recom-
mendations, and communications as a means of advancing human rights is inadequate because 
legalism allows or facilitates, for example, 1) the exclusion of victims and stakeholders from the 
creation of mainstream human rights narratives 2) an inherent connectedness to liberal individu-
alism  and 3) a depoliticization of subjects by conveying human rights as an apolitical discourse 6
on suffering.  The first point is evident from my own experiences, advocating at a UN-level for 7
the full and meaningful participation of minorities and protected classes in peace processes and 
human rights agenda-setting. I derive the second and third points from Wendy Brown’s and Janet 
Halley’s work. 
 I hyphenate “legal-liberal” in this paper not to signify a synonymous relationship or us-
age, but a connectedness of these two distinct characteristics of human rights. Brown and Halley 
in Left Legalism/Left Critique group “Left/Liberal” to signify a simultaneous connectedness and 
 Rhonda Schlangen, “Monitoring and Evaluation for Human Rights Organizations: Three Case Studies.” 4
The Center for Evaluation Innovation. (2014) P. 3. 
 Alicia Ely Yamin. (Professor and Program Director of the Health and Human Rights Initiative at 5
Georgetown Law). Interview with author. July 17, 2018. 
 Wendy Brown. “‘The Most We Can Hope For’…Human Rights and the Politics of Fatalism.” The South 6
Atlantic Quarterly. Vol 103, No. 2/3: (2004). pp. 451-463. p. 455.
 Wendy Brown, “Suffering Rights as Paradoxes,” Constellations, Vol. 7 Issue 2. (2008). p. 4317
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distinction “between liberal and left legalism.”  Recognizing the connections liberalism has to 8
legalistic methodologies which are outlined in Brown’s and Halley’s work, I connect these terms. 
Brown explains, “to the extent that human rights are understood as the ability to protect oneself 
against injustice and define one’s own ends in life, this is a form of ‘empowerment’ that fully 
equates empowerment with liberal individualism.”  While legal methods are arguably the most 9
prominent method for transformation and/or protection in human rights studies, I argue that 
rights discourses are also liberal in nature.  In probing this dynamic, I seek to understand the 10
inadequacies of international human rights legal processes and institutions. Along with this 
methodological critique, I explore one alternative platform for human rights work—socially en-
gaged art—in order to understand the politics, relationships, and dynamics of non-legal human 
rights projects and their potential. 
Relevance, Motivation, Objective 
 Various scholars assert that current legal-liberal methods in human rights are inadequate 
for ending the negative effects of depoliticizing universal rights holders through legal subject 
formation. For example, Brown (2004) articulates subjects formed by rights discourses as “enti-
tled” yet depoliticized and existing in a state of injury.  Her understanding of subject formation 11
derives heavily from Foucaultdian notions of governmentality and technologies of power. Al-
 Wendy Brown and Janet Halley, Left Liberalism/Left Critique, Duke University Books (2009) p. 58
 Wendy Brown. “‘The Most” p. 455.9
 Brown and Halley (2009) argue that rights are one form in which “the left has sought to mobilize the 10
implicit promise of the liberal state that it will attempt to make justice happen by means of the law.” (p. 9)
 Wendy Brown. “The Most” p. 455,45611
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though Foucault understands subject formation to be pervasive and inevitable, Brown’s descrip-
tion of subject formation through rights discourses emphasizes the detrimental outcomes of de-
politicizing and entitlement-granting procedures, such as Foucault’s “technologies of power.”  I 
examine one possible alternative method for human rights discourses and projects to shed light 
on the limitations of legal approaches to protecting, advancing, and articulating human rights. 
While I am not analyzing socially engaged art as a method for achieving human rights change, I 
am analyzing socially engaged art as a process of amelioration for modern, universal subjects of 
human rights who are depoliticized by legalism.  Through this amelioration of the depoliticizing 12
effects of legalism, I argue that new forms of human rights subjectivity can be envisioned. 
 It is important for me to note as well that how I use the term “socially engaged art.” My 
definition of socially engaged art oscillates on a spectrum—while many art historians may ad-
here to more rigid notions of socially engaged art, I use the term more flexibly. Claire Bishop, for 
example, one of the leading scholars on socially engaged art, is critical of projects which claim to 
be socially engaged art, yet give little mind to the aesthetic dimensions of the project.  What 13
makes art art is uniquely salient to socially engaged art, according to Bishop; components of col-
lectivity and a political character may not suffice alone to be considered “socially engaged art.” 
However, any strictly logical aesthetic analysis, on the other hand, risks “discussing these prac-
tices solely in positivist terms, that is, by focusing on demonstrable impact.”  For this reason, 14
Bishop emphasizes the aesthetic components of socially engaged art “in the sense of aisthesis: an 
 Brown, “The Most,” p. 451-463.12
 Claire Bishop. Artificial hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship, Brooklyn, NY: Verso 13
Books, (2012). 
 Ibid, p. 1814
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autonomous regime of experience that is not reducible to logic, reason or motive.”  In my ef15 -
forts to understand the potential of non-legal human rights projects such as socially engaged art, I 
analyze four socially engaged art projects with both aesthetic and human rights lenses. Recogniz-
ing Bishop’s aesthetic critiques, I analyze various projects which range on a spectrum of socially 
engaged art from highly attentive to aesthetics, to loosely aesthetically concerned and more 
overtly political. In determining which projects to highlight, I use criteria such as: collectivity 
and participation (a project which places “pressure on conventional modes of artistic production 
and consumption under capitalism,” in Bishop’s words),  an emphasis on process rather than an 16
emphasis on product, and whether the art addresses one or multiple human rights issues. Using 
diverse projects as case studies, I ask, for example: What does collectivity reveal about liberal 
individualism?  In what ways can art be political? What do the mediums and methods of the 17
projects do that is distinct from their thematic statements? These basic questions lead me to cri-
tique various features of human rights legalism such as liberal individualism and the creation of 
power structures while also highlighting the potential of non-legal human rights projects (such as 
socially engaged art) for advancing human rights. I discuss these ideas and other key components 
from relevant scholarship in my literature review. 
 Recognizing the flaws of legalism in human rights—of which I emphasize an inherent 
connectedness to liberal individualism, and a depoliticization of subjects by conveying human 
 Ibid.15
 Ibid, p. 216
 In this paper, I see “liberal individualism” as a product of formations of modernity which human rights 17
legalism cannot undo. Because human rights legalism isolates human rights subjects and is itself embed-
ded in modernity, it fails to empower subjects to break down these formations or progressively work to-
gether towards utopian ideals.
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rights as an apolitical discourse on suffering —I seek to understand the ways in which a non-18
legal human rights project such as socially engaged art can operate, and what these types of 
projects are capable of achieving. I am particularly interested in questions of subject formation 
facilitated by legalism. I do not assert that subject formation is bad in and of itself—Foucault and 
others instruct us that it is inevitable. Rather, it is the impacts of this subject formation which 
must be unpacked and considered. If law is the tool of the human rights corpus, but legal meth-
ods produce modern, universal subjects which are entitled yet victimized (a paradox Wendy 
Brown and Make Mutua center much of their scholarship on), then the human rights project is 
failing in its goals to achieve empowerment, equality, and justice.  I want to underline the im19 -
portance of one alternative method which does human rights work, not in that it initiates justice 
or transformation necessarily, but in that it can demonstrate certain lapses in human rights legal-
ism and can provide opportunities for the politicization of modern, universal subjects of human 
rights. Socially engaged art, I argue, is one alternative to current human rights methodologies: it 
politicizes what is conveyed as an anti political discourse on suffering, and thus counters apoliti-
cal, liberal subject formation produced by legal technologies of power in human rights. In this 
way, socially engaged art is not only ameliorative of the detrimental effects of human rights le-
galism, but it is a radical alternative filled with potential to supplement legal human rights work.  
 My driving research question is two-fold: 1) How is legalism in human rights inadequate 
or limited? And 2) In what ways can socially engaged art challenge human rights legalism and 
 Makau Mutua, for example, asserts that the metaphor of modern human rights is the “savage-victim-18
savior” structure in which the “victim figure is a powerless, helpless innocent” unable to act in a political 
way, outside the bounds of human rights “naturalness, trans historicity, and universality” (203, 208). 
 Ibid, p. 455, 45619
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offer a supplement to legalistic human rights work? My goal is not to demonstrate any sort of 
causal analysis, but rather, to unpack the various critiques of legal-liberal approaches to human 
rights and to understand how socially engaged art works as a potential tool for human rights 
projects.  First, in a review of relevant literature, I clearly outline the terms to be used in my 20
analysis as well, relying on various scholars to inform my definitions of legalism and theories of 
socially engaged art. Second, I support this scholarship with four case studies which focus on 
socially engaged art projects which do human rights work. Finally, I end with a reflection on 
these analyses and some conclusions on the limitations of human rights legalism, and the role of 
non legal human rights projects, utilizing the example of socially engaged art.  
 I have several preliminary suspicions: 1) legalism in human rights severely limits the po-
tential of human rights discourses and projects, and 2) socially engaged art can provide the op-
portunities and the tools to envision new forms of human rights subjectivity, outside of modern, 
liberal, individualistic formations. Although it is important to note that not all socially engaged 
art does human rights work—collectivity as such does not in itself cure the ills of legalism 
(which perpetuates liberal individualism)—in pointing to some projects which do human rights 
work, I emphasize the power and richness of non legal human rights projects in critiquing legal-
ism. These critiques, in turn, sustain utopian or ideal visions of human rights futures. 
 I must note, also, that I do not insinuate that art may be reduced to its abilities to affect certain out20 -
comes. I understand that the word “tool” raises these concerns. However, while art has various purposes 
and functions, I argue that to act as a method for an engagement with human rights work is only one func-
tion.
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II. SECTION TWO 
LITERATURE REVIEW: HUMAN RIGHTS CRITIQUES &  
SOCIALLY ENGAGED ART THEORY 
 In this overview of the literature on socially engaged art and its relationship to legal-lib-
eral methods in human rights, I attempt to create a cohesive image of the ways in which liberal-
legal methods in human rights work (work to protect and promote human rights) are inadequate 
and the potential which socially engaged art has for ameliorating these inadequacies and acting 
as a tool in its own right, full of radical possibilities for engagement with human rights work. Al-
though much of the literature on liberalism and subject formation through the law has a limited 
engagement with critical art theory or aesthetics, my goal is to make these two discourses speak 
to one another in an effort to question their current and potential relationship and its impact on 
human rights. I begin with an introduction to my topic and a rephrasing of the research question. 
From there, I dissect the different aspects of this question, introducing various concepts as articu-
lated by scholars in both political theory and critical art theory. I begin my analysis of the litera-
ture with legalism and liberalism, facilitating a conversation among scholars such as Wendy 
Brown, Michel Foucault, Janet Halley, and Samera Esmeir.  After fleshing out theories of legal 
liberalism as they relate to human rights, I incorporate a discussion on theories of socially en-
gaged art which I have divided into two dimensions: the aesthetic—through the lenses of Grant 
Kester and Claire Bishop primarily—and the social—as perceived by Bishop, Thompson, and 
Butler. Both of these dimensions are central to my questioning of the relationship between so-
cially engaged art and legal-liberal notions of human rights, which I hope to make clear by first 
articulating my preliminary research questions/hypotheses. 
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Introduction, Terminology, Critiques 
 I must begin by unpacking what I mean by “legal-liberal.” Wendy Brown and Janet Hal-
ley are my primary authorities on this pair of terms, though their authority is inherently linked to 
their predecessors Foucault and Butler (whom I will also examine). In Left Legalism/Left Cri-
tique, Brown and Halley explain the motivations for their project—the “sacred cow status of le-
gal reform,”  and the idea that “theoretical critique is a crucial practice for understanding how 21
legalism can transform and attenuate the values and aims that leftists bring to it,”  They articu22 -
late the concept of legalism as that which “pointedly and directly tie[s] broad-based, locally and 
culturally rich ‘movement’ politics to demands for state enforced rights.”  Brown and Halley 23
take up the example of the U.S. Civil Rights Movement, whose emancipatory efforts which en-
compassed social, cultural and economic rights were/are often reduced to its legal and liberal 
modes of protest and change.  This inevitably constricts and reduces many human rights efforts 24
to movements for civil and political rights. This reduction and limitation is often the outcome of 
legalism in human rights. However, Brown and Halley are adamant that not all rights projects are 
legalistic.  25
 Liberalism, according to Brown and Halley, is not a political position, but a political or-
der which assumes equality and figures the law as neutral and applicable at a formal but not con-
 Wendy Brown, and Janet Halley. Left Legalism/Left Critique, P. 3.21
 Ibid, p. 4.22
 Ibid, p. 7.23
 Ibid.24
 Ibid. p. 2025
!  of !13 90
crete level.  According to their critique, liberalism and legalism are deeply connected in that 26
“legalism often deploys liberalism as a normativizing, regulatory form of power.”  Left Legal27 -
ism/Left Critique seeks to demonstrate the “possibility of political projects not saturated by legal-
istic constraints and aims.”  As an example, they elaborate on a particular antipornography fem28 -
inist movement which, although deeply political, they argue was not legalistic.  Their research 29
and examples inform my research as I seek to demonstrate the ways socially engaged art (as a 
non-legal project) combats liberal modalities which limit human rights work through an individ-
ualizing and depoliticizing manner of subject formation. Brown, in a 2004 piece in response to 
Michael Ignatieff, also elaborates on liberalism, specifically in terms of empowerment, noting 
the irony of tying empowerment through liberal individualism to the apolitical discourse on suf-
fering in human rights.  If human rights subjects are entitled to rights, yet apolitical, how is 30
self-empowerment possible? Brown argues this is conflicting. 
 This brings us to Foucault, whose work is the necessary and crucial predecessor to 
Brown’s and Halley’s. I employ Foucault’s “The Subject of Power” to elaborate on Brown’s and 
Halley’s theories and connect them to the legal-liberal organization of human rights and socially 
engaged art. Foucault studies power because of the questions its analysis raises regarding the 
subject—the subject being that object (human) which receives and responds to the regulation of 
 Ibid. p. 626
 Ibid, p. 17.27
 Ibid, p. 20.28
 Ibid. p. 20-2329
 Brown, “The Most,” p. 45530
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the state.  Foucault understands the subject as a product of institutional architecture: “institu31 -
tions act essentially by bringing into play two elements, explicit or tacit regulations and an appa-
ratus.”  Power, according to Foucault, regulates the conduct of subjects—“the possible field of 32
action of others”— through institutional structures such as law. However, the point is “to attack 
not so much ‘such and such’ institutional power, or group, or elite, or class, but rather a tech-
nique, a form of power,” which these institutions possess.  Therefore, I do not criticize law or 33
legal rights as such, but rather, the technologies of power which they utilize in their human rights 
work. My inclination to mobilize Foucault for my research comes from this assertion. Law, as an 
institution formulates the universal, suffering, apolitical subject through individualizing and to-
talizing technologies of power. Foucault argues not for an attack on institutions or groups in 
power, but rather, a rebellion against a specific technique or form of power which: 
 applies itself to immediate everyday life which categorizes the individual, marks him by   
 his own individuality, attaches him to his own identity, imposes a law of truth on him   
 which he must recognize and which others have to recognize in him. It is a form of power 
 which makes individuals subjects.  34
It is because of this pervasive character and individualizing effect that I often frame subjectivity 
as “individualizing/totalizing.” 
 Foucault goes into great detail about the nature of power and the objective of social 
struggles. However, the point of his essay which I am most drawn to for my analysis is his strong 
assertions regarding the dangers of individualizing/totalizing forms of subjectivity.  Social 35
 Michel Foucault. In Power, Ed. Dreyfus, Hubert and Rabinow, Paul. (London: Penguin. 2000) P. 20831
 Ibid, p. 22232
 Ibid. p. 212.33
 Ibid.34
 Ibid. 35
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struggles, according to Foucault, must not necessarily resist the state, but rather must resist these 
individualizing/totalizing forms of power (embodied in institutions such as the law) which signify  
various types of subject formation. Subject formation is not in itself detrimental. However, it is 
the type of subject formation triggered by legalism in human rights—creating universal, apoliti-
cal, suffering subjects—that is dangerous for human rights projects. 
 More recently, Samera Esmeir has written on this idea of the universal, suffering subject 
and conduct as it relates to human rights in her essay “In the Land of the International.” She 
writes that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights “establishes a peculiar hierarchy between 
rebellion and human rights.”  Writing both with and against Hannah Arendt, Esmeir argues hu36 -
man rights “overturn other political horizons of action.”  She demonstrates the paradoxes of 37
human rights under the “international” regime. For example, she outlines two consequences of 
“the international” order and argues that these consequences have vast implications on human 
rights globally:  
 the international became a new signifier of the world, limiting its meaning to the    
 relationship between states… when Bentham first coined it, the term ‘international’   
 had no temporal dimension. History, tradition and the movement of time were not   
 central to the meaning of the international…over time, as the scope of the international,   
 in its juridicial itinerary, expanded to include other states as part of the international   
 family of nations, the international began to signify a progressive overcoming of the   
 past: a Eurocentric world, a less expansive international society and a narrow    
 recognition of the will of only sovereign states.  38
 Esmeir, ”In the land of the international” P. 362.36
 Ibid. 37
 Ibid, p. 364.38
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Here we have two negative impacts of conduct which were created and are facilitated by in-
ternational order: an exclusion of the subject and a Eurocentric progressive view of time and 
change.  
 Esmeir concludes with an example to clarify her assertions. Refugees, she explains, oper-
ate outside of the institutionalized appropriate “conduct” of human rights every day: they violate 
borders, “loot” for food, smuggle illegally, etc. What Esmeir is suggesting, which is very crucial 
to my analysis, is that there are projects and ways of working against oppression which operate 
outside the bounds of legality. She writes that: 
 …in fleeing and seeking refuge, refugees do not attempt to resolve the question of their   
 human status; European governments are more preoccupied with this matter. Rather,   
 they chart new routes for inhabiting a new part of the world, as they follow ancient   
 routes of migration and movement. These are the actions—not only rebellious actions—  
 that human rights declarations cannot capture.  39
In order to “capture” these actions, human rights authorities would need to include the right to 
cross borders, the right to smuggle, the right to disrupt the international fabric of legal human 
rights. The impossibility of this leads me to suggest the limits of human rights legalism and a 
hope in non-legal political projects such as socially engaged art. 
 There are, however, political projects with egalitarian aims, such as various women’s 
rights movements, that have adopted liberal notions of governmentality which can be analyzed to 
contemplate the effects of legalism. My final source on liberal legalism is Governance Feminism, 
a clear example of this. “Governance Feminism” as articulated by Halley and others, is exem-
plary of the burdens of egalitarian projects which take on forms of liberal governmentality (à la 
Foucault). This, I argue, is one of the main ailments of human rights work, and I hope to use Hal-
 Ibid, p. 365.39
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ley’s analysis of Governance Feminism to demonstrate the negative impacts of legalism in 
projects aimed at advancing human rights.  
 Governance Feminism is defined as “…every form in which feminists and feminist ideas 
exert a governing will within human affairs: to follow Michel Foucault’s definition of govern-
mentality, every form in which feminists and feminist ideas ‘conduct the conduct of men.’”  She 40
begins by acknowledging several of the positive outcomes achieved by Governance Feminism 
with a tacit recognition that Governance Feminism also excludes various aspects of feminist 
projects from our political vision (understanding that there is, of course, no single version of 
feminism, but rather feminisms which exist beholden to their dominant form—governance femi-
nism). The question of Governance Feminism is: how does/can feminism remain radical if it is 
immersed in institutions of governance?  As Janet Halley and others assert in this book, some41 -
thing happens when our political and social projects are subsumed by modes of governmentality 
such as the law. What is that thing that happens? This question captures a primary question of 
this research: “To what extent does legalism create limitations for human rights work?” 
Socially Engaged Art Theory 
	 Now that I have explored the limitations of legal-liberal approaches to human rights, I 
turn to theory on socially engaged art. Although aesthetics and the social are inherently inter-
twined (Ranciere, Bishop, Kester, and others agree), for the sake of this review, I find it helpful 
to dissect socially engaged art literature on two dimensions: the aesthetic and the social. Though 
  Janet Halley et.al. Governance Feminism. (University of Minnesota Press, 2018). P. vii. 40
 Ibid.41
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much of the literature I will bring into the discussion addresses both simultaneously, I begin with 
the Introduction to the anthology Living as Form to parse some distinctions and concepts before 
turning to aesthetic and social elements of socially engaged art.  
 In Living as Form, the editor Nato Thompson writes that “socially engaged art is not an 
art movement. Rather, these cultural practices indicate a new social order—ways of life that em-
phasize participation, challenge power and span disciplines ranging from urban planning and 
community work to theater and visual arts.”  He explains that categorizing socially engaged art 42
via discipline is difficult, but it is recognizable methodologically: we see socially engaged art in 
types of gatherings, types of media manipulation, research and its presentation, types of commu-
nicating, and structural alternatives. Herein lies the importance of socially engaged art, which 
Foucault articulated in his essay as well: we understand power through understanding resistance 
to existing structures.  However, we also understand resistance by understanding power. 43
Thompson explains that “without understanding that the manipulation of symbols has become a 
method of production for the dominant powers in contemporary society, we cannot appreciate the 
forms of resistance to that power that come from numerous artists, activists, and engaged citi-
zens.”  This is key to my research: not only is analyzing legalism in human rights important for 44
understanding critical and rebellious projects (such as artistic resistance and articulations of hu-
man rights), but analyzing socially engaged art as a form of resistance is important for under-
standing dominant structures and methods used by the human rights corpus. 
 Nato Thompson, “Introduction” in Living as Form: Socially Engaged Art From 1991-2011, ed. Nato 42
Thompson. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2017. P. 19
 Foucault, “The Subject of Power” P. 211.43
Thompson, “Introduction” P. 30.44
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 Understanding the social dimensions of socially engaged art is crucial, but an understand-
ing of the role of aesthetics and its relationship to the political is also necessary. Claire Bishop, 
one of the leading scholars on participatory art and critical art theory, writes on this in Artificial 
Hells. In this three-part book, Bishop explores 1) theoretical underpinnings of socially engaged 
art, 2) historical examples of socially engaged art projects, and 3) a historicization of post-1989 
socially engaged art which focuses on tendencies of contemporary participatory art projects.  45
For my purposes, the first section of Artificial Hells is most relevant.  
 Bishop explains the relevancy and necessity of addressing the aesthetic dimension of so-
cially engaged art. She writes that “value judgements are necessary, not as a means to reinforce 
elite culture and police the boundaries of art and non-art, but as a way to understand and clarify 
our shared values at a given historical moment.”   46
 Bishop intimately engages with philosopher Jacques Ranciere’s theories of aesthetics. 
Ranciere deems aesthetics as innately dimensional to politics, knowledge, and art, as that com-
ponent which formulates what he calls the “sensible” (that which is perceivable, imaginable). He 
writes on aesthetics as a modality, as an experience which “intervenes in the distribution of the 
sensible” and makes new possibilities “sensible” or imaginable.  Bishop, applying Ranciere’s 47
aesthetic theories to socially engaged art, makes a case for centering aesthetics as a way to un-
derstand how art (specifically socially engaged artworks) can disrupt ways of perceiving life and 
bring about new possible perceptions. 
 Bishop, Artificial Hells.45
Ibid, p. 8.46
 Jacques Ranciere, “The Aesthetic Dimension: Aesthetics, politics, Knowledge,” Critical Inquiry, Vol. 47
36 No. 1 (2009) 1-19. P. 5.
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  Bishop continues with valuable and critical points about the aesthetics of socially en-
gaged art. She explains that aesthetics do not need to be “sacrificed at the altar of social change, 
because it always already contains this ameliorative promise.”  This “ameliorative promise” is 48
embedded in aesthetic’s innate relationship to the political—a relationship she notes from 
Ranciere. Bishop later elaborates on the social dimensions of socially engaged art as well. For 
example, she notes that, by nature of being collective, socially engaged art projects have “…seen 
a renewed affirmation of collectivity and a denigration of the individual, who becomes synony-
mous with the values of Cold War liberalism and its transformation into neoliberalism”—a point 
which is certainly relevant when considering the individualizing and totalizing nature of gov-
ernmentality and its institutions.  Yet, her distinctions remain nuanced: Bishop does not see aes49 -
thetics as emblematic of values necessarily, nor does she see all socially engaged art as collective 
or collectivity as inherently oppositional to individuality.  It is this flexibility characterizing 50
Bishop’s descriptions of socially engaged art, I argue, which allows for promising possibilities.  
 Bishop engages with multiple art theorists and critics, one of whom I find value in includ-
ing: Grant Kester. His book The One and The Many, in three chapters, meditates on participatory 
art’s critique of the relationship between aesthetics and autonomy, the material conditions and 
epistemological effects of collaboration, and ends with an examination of collaborative groups 
 Ibid, p. 29.48
 Ibid, p. 12. 49
 Later in her first chapter, she criticizes socially engaged art’s “inclusion agenda” as conservative of 50
capitalist ideology, explaining that “social inclusion agenda is therefore less about repairing the social 
bond than a mission to enable all members of society to be self-administering, fully functioning con-
sumers.” 
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working in urban settings.  My primary concerns are with the first matters of Kester’s work: 51
aesthetic’s relationship with autonomy (and how autonomy—a key feature of liberal legalism in 
human rights—can be complicated by socially engaged art). Kester traces the origins of socially 
engaged art to the 1980s and 1990s and points to three main transformations initiated by this 
shift from autonomous to collective: 1) a complication of “ conventional notions of aesthetic au-
tonomy” 2) a transformation in forms of knowledge produced by collaborative, participatory art 
projects and 3) a new appreciation for modes of reception of art, which suggest dialogic ap-
proaches (as opposed to a work being approached as a monologue, dialogic approaches imply a 
two-way relationship between art work and viewer).  Kester’s meditations on the transforma52 -
tions which were signaled by the shift from the autonomous to the collective are valuable to my 
understanding of socially engaged art as a combative tool against the isolating effects of liberal 
governmentality. 
 As Bishop has pointed out in various works, visual analyses of socially engaged art fall 
short. There must be, to some extent, an interrogation of the social dimensions as well in order to 
properly understand and criticize socially engaged art as a method and tool for human rights 
work.  I turn now to Nato Thompson’s Seeing Power for an introduction to this element.  53
 In his book, Thompson investigates how, in the age of consumer capitalism where images 
are perpetually projected onto us and produced by us, we can decipher what is true and how to 
 Grant Kester. The One and The Many: Contemporary Collaborative Art in a Global    51
Context. (Durham: Duke University, 2011)
 Ibid, p. 9.52
 Bishop, Artificial Hells. 53
!  of !22 90
best make change.  Through chapters of examples and analyses, Thompson argues that socially 54
engaged art can and does provide a method for approaching these questions and inhabiting a 
world dominated by capitalist consumerism.   55
 His chapter “Cultural Production Makes a World” is of key importance. He examines 
“the spectacle”—Guy Debord’s term for “the confluence of capital and culture, particularly mass 
culture, that had come to dominate the postwar era.”  Through “the spectacle,” waves of capital56 -
ist cultural production were felt, and Thompson argues that socially engaged art was the art 
world’s response. Writing as Brown, Halley, Foucault and Kester have on the failures of autono-
my he explains that “…in its emphasis on the participatory and the social, the movement can be 
considered a necessary reaction to the alienating effects of media and manipulative culture mak-
ing.”  What Thompson calls “the alienating effects of media and manipulative culture making” 57
Foucault, Brown and Halley might connect to liberal governentality—the creation of conduct 
through individualizing and totalizing means. Seeing Power is an explanation of the ways in 
which socially engaged art has responded to these methods of power historically. 
 Finally, I consult Judith Butler’s Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly. 
Through six chapters she articulates a very simple but powerful thesis: acting in concert can be a 
 Nato Thompson, Seeing Power: Socially Engaged Art in the Age of Cultural Production. (Brooklyn, 54
N.Y.: Melville House 2016). 
 This is crucial because capitalist consumerism supports and is built upon the notion of liberal individu55 -
alism, and is also a formation of modernity, like legalism, which impacts human rights discourses and 
work.
 Ibid, p. 11. 56
 Ibid, p. 19. 57
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form of calling into question reigning notions of the political.  In her examinations of precarity 58
and the theory of protest, she brings attention to the ways by which simply acting collectively 
can be a powerful form of protest against dominant power structures and political order. By en-
gaging with political theorists such as Arendt, Butler describes how assembly (collective action 
or non-action) is an embodiment of equality. This assembly or collectivity is a crucial component 
of certain forms of socially engaged art which I argue facilitates human rights work. 
 If liberalism worships the autonomous, regulated individual and liberal-legal methods are 
inadequate for human rights work, collectivity offers an alternative. To articulate this, Butler em-
ploys speech-act theory: “to say ‘we the people’ is performative in that it brings into being that 
group which it names.”  To return to Samera Esmeir’s example of refugees redefining the 59
boundaries of human rights: marginalized groups who exist in precarity and whose existence 
cannot be captured by human rights declarations are excluded because of human rights’ legal ap-
proach to conduct-making. Butler argues that collective assembly is a useful tool for protesting 
this political order. This conclusion leads me to examine the ways in which socially engaged art, 
as a form of collective action, enacts Butler’s theories.  
 Although I feel that the literature described here is useful in constructing an approach to 
my questions, I want to pause to recognize the limitations it poses. All of these works contribut-
ing to my terminology, human rights critiques, and background on socially engaged art present 
strictly a theoretical take on the roles of liberalism, legalism, and socially engaged art. While I 
recognize the radical potential of these resources, I note also the limitations they possess when 
 Judith Butler, Notes Toward a Performative Theory of Assembly. (Harvard University Press, 2018). 58
 Ibid, p. 169. 59
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my audience is human rights workers, critics, and activists. To connect these theoretical queries 
and assertions to the concrete implications and realities I investigate, I must add my own original 
research to the conversation. It is with this understanding and with this arsenal of nuanced theo-
retical support which I search for concrete specifics: What can non-legal human rights projects 
such as socially engaged art reveal about the current flaws and possible futures of human rights? 
How can they do this? 
III. SECTION THREE 
CASE STUDIES AND ANALYSIS 
 To begin my analysis of various socially engaged art projects and the human rights issues 
they center, I first introduce my research methodology and outline the case studies of the next 
chapter. The data collected in this research is derived from images, interviews, and pre-existing 
reviews of the projects I analyze. I utilize these tools together to understand the ways in which 
legalism operates to structure power within human rights projects and how nonlegal human 
rights projects—of which certain socially engaged art projects could be categorized— can ame-
liorate the effects of or supplement legal human rights projects. 
 I focus on four projects: Thomas Hirschhorn’s Gramsci Monument, Mel Chin’s and Tracy 
Reese’s Flint Fit, Ai Weiwei’s Good Fences Make Good Neighbors, and Pablo Helguera’s The 
School of Panamerican Unrest.  Each project acts as a case study for the primary questions of 60
 It is important to note here that while the artists of these works may not necessarily perceive their work 60
as a “non legal human rights project” or even as a “socially engaged art project,” I have created the 
unique category of “human rights socially engaged art work” to characterize the works I analyze. Not all 
socially engaged art is a non legal human rights project. However, I assert the possibility of human rights 
work in socially engaged art projects which possess or embody components of collectivity and politiciza-
tion.
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this research which has three main components: 1) some background on the project, including 
information about the setting or audience or participants and the human rights issues centered by 
the project 2) the flaws in the legal approaches towards the human rights emphasized by the 
project 3) the aesthetic and methodological descriptions of the project and the possibilities these 
create for human rights work.  
 Some questions I raise will be: how does legalism manifest in the human rights issues 
each project raises? how do these projects vary thematically but also methodologically? What do 
the methodologies of each project—the mediums and the processes—do for viewers and partici-
pants? How is that inherently different from what legalism does? Are these projects effective 
challenges to human rights legalism? 
 To gain a more robust understanding of these questions, I conducted several formal, 
semi-structured interviews and informal discussions with artists, activists, and scholars on the 
relationship between socially engaged art and human rights. Semi-structured interviews were 
conducted with Laura Kauer, PEN America’s Artist at Risk Connection Coordinator; Marissa 
Gutierrez-Vicario, artist and founder of ARTE (Art and Resistance Through Education); and Pro-
fessor Alicia Ely Yamin, Senior Scholar in Residence at Harvard’s Global Health Education and 
Learning Incubator. While I understand that this is a limited pool of interviewees for a project of 
this magnitude, I argue that the experiences and background of these experts shape my research 
in a much richer way than a larger survey might have. Each participant brings unique perspec-
tives to the social, aesthetic, legal, and political elements of my project. 
 The goal of interviews was not to gain a more intimate and nuanced understanding of the 
case studies, some of which the interviewees may be unfamiliar with. Rather, by engaging with 
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these participants, I sought to discover the pervasiveness of human rights legalism and the feasi-
bility, for a variety of interlocutors, of considering the potential of socially engaged art as a hu-
man rights project. My interviewees come from a variety of backgrounds and levels of familiari-
ty with socially engaged art, human rights, and law. 
 I first spoke with Gutierrez-Vicario, whose experiences working with youth give her a 
unique perspective on the potential of art projects for human rights work, and the dynamics of art 
work as human rights work. ARTE is an organization which uses art to, “develop creative 
projects that bring awareness to local and global human rights challenges.”  Through my expe61 -
riences observing projects and participating in workshops with ARTE, it is clear that artists like 
Gutierrez-Vicario and organizations like ARTE attempt to do this collectively, facilitating rela-
tionships and interactions among participants.  Gutierrez-Vicario, reflecting on her experiences 62
creating art with youth and facilitating a pedagogical engagement with human rights issues 
among students, insists on socially engaged art’s unique ability to do human rights work. She 
explains that art does human rights work by, "using a part of your brain that’s not normally 
used…the the process of creation and the product are both important…self-reflection is distinct 
to art which is important.”  Gutierrez-Vicario’s reflections are key to understanding how creat63 -
ing art can not only thematically raise awareness of human rights work and issues, but can, in 
itself, be a form of human rights work.  
 “About ARTE” ARTE, Accessed October 5, 2018. https://www.artejustice.org/about61
 During this research, I participated in a workshop by ARTE in December 2017 and observed one so62 -
cially engaged project, Global Women Heroes, which took place in May 2018.
 Informal conversation with the author, March 23, 2018.63
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 Observing an ARTE project was also useful for challenging scholarly distinctions be-
tween “social art” and “aesthetic art.” While Gutierrez-Vicario’s projects would likely be catego-
rized by some as loosely aesthetic and overtly activist in nature, I argue this does not reduce the 
power of ARTE’s example. Although some socially engaged art works art more overtly activist 
than others, as Gutierrez-Vicario’s work demonstrates, it is the tensions between these distinc-
tions—“activist” or “political” or “high art”—which perhaps have the most robust productivity 
for art and for society. By toeing the line of categories such as “political art,” “social art,” or “ac-
tivist art,” artists like Gutierrez-Vicario encourage a more meaningful and nuanced characteriza-
tion of socially engaged art. 
 Others I spoke with were particularly useful in teasing out ideas related to human rights 
legalism. Professor Yamin provided useful insights on the construction of the subject through law 
and what human rights legalism means for human rights. Yamin speaks about the subject in 
terms of the “creative subject:” one which possesses the agency to act upon the world. During 
our conversation, Yamin noted the barriers to accessing law as a tool for advancing human rights, 
explaining that much of what is written about human rights uses a language and discourse that 
excludes the very people who should have access to this information. If human rights is about 
diffusion of power, she argues, then human rights should also prioritize diffusing knowledge. 
Yamin makes important distinctions on human rights legalism as well, which she describes as a 
“brittle positivism” that relies heavily on references to conventions and general comments.   64
 This type of legalism, which Yamin deemed “sterile legalism,” Gutierrez-Vicario notices 
in her interactions with students as well. Gutierrez-Vicario explained that when she uses human 
 Informal conversation with the author, July 17, 2018.64
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rights legal terminology—we spoke specifically of the term “socioeconomic rights” during our 
conversation—students may reject any further engagement in the discussion. However, once she 
breaks down the terminology and reshapes the conversation in a more accessible way, students 
enthusiastically make conceptual distinctions on human rights issues. 
 While Yamin is familiar with legalism and its effects, it was important to the goals of this 
research to also ask her about socially engaged art, which she describes broadly, “in terms of 
what it does for the creator and participants and witnesses.” While she recognizes the intrinsic 
value of art as a creative act, she insists that socially engaged art is also:  
 an act of resistance, of solidarity, of empathy… a practice that makes us reflect on the   
 social reality or the political moment or the human condition through some creative   
 means. Its a kind of practice that awakens consciousness in a way the many other kinds   
 of human rights work doesn’t. It’s about awakening people as creative subjects.  65
Gutierrez-Vicario’s response echoes this—she states that the process and products of creation are 
both important, and that “Art allows possibilities for reimagining realities.”  Yamin’s and 66
Gutierrez-Vicario’s insights are reflective of Ranciere’s theorization of the relationship between 
politics and aesthetics. Ranciere argues that the creation a dissensus through the imagination of 
alternative realities—through creativity, through resistance, etc.—is itself an aesthetic affair.  If, 67
as he posits, aesthetics is the “distribution of the sensible,” it is the means of determining what is 
imaginable, then aesthetics and politics are intimately intertwined.   68
 Ibid.65
 Informal conversation with the author, March 23, 2018.66
 Ranciere, “The Aesthetic Dimension” p. 1167
 Ranciere, “The Aesthetic Dimension” p. 168
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 Most important, perhaps, were Yamin’s comments on the relationship between art and 
politicization. In light of her comments on law as an inaccessible tool for some who strive to ad-
vance human rights, she elaborated on the potential of socially engaged art as a form of empow-
erment and resistance. For Yamin, art is political “In much more than a sloganeering way… The 
act of creativity is itself political. It is itself something that defies being told what to do and what 
we are and circumscribed by the powers that be.”  In insisting on the political nature of the cre69 -
ative subject, Yamin points out how artistic work is innately a form of resistance to depoliticizing 
subject formation. As states guarantee individuals the right to live lives as they deem fit, this 
guarantee, “constitutes a juridical limit on regimes without empowering individuals as political 
actors.”   State neglect to empower individuals as political actors is perhaps not synonymous to, 70
but certainly an active contributor to “the suspension of politics” for human rights subjects.   71
This depoliticization—which occurs through the reduction and victimization of human rights 
subjects—is intentionally and powerfully opposed by acts of creativity such as socially engaged 
art work. 
 During an interview with Laura Kauer, PEN America’s Artist at Risk Connection (ARC) 
Coordinator who has an academic and professional background in human rights work, she spoke 
about the relationship between socially engaged art and human rights in terms of her specific ex-
periences with ARC. She is more cautious in connecting art with politicization, noting that, “A 
lot of artists would be nervous about this conversation in that they do not want to see their art as 
 Informal conversation with the author, July 17, 2018. 69
 Brown, “The Most” P. 456. 70
 Jacques Ranciere, “Who is the Subject of the Rights of Man?” The South Atlantic Quarterly, Volume 71
103, Number 2/3. (2004): p. 301. 
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propaganda.”  Her characterization of “political” seems to be inherently linked to social ac72 -
tivism, which she has seen many international artists reject due to the threats and dangers they 
endure for the social activism they take on outside of their artistic practices.  
 In other points during our discussion, Kauer also raised points which Bishop emphasizes 
in her scholarship on aesthetics. Kauer stated that “Art, a lot of times, is responding to a mo-
ment… When the conversation around politics is limited, when there is oppression, artists pro-
duce art robustly.”  Echoing Bishop’s scholarship on aesthetics as reflective of values during a 73
particular moment, Kauer describes art as a response, as a way of politicizing issues in oppres-
sive environments.  Although she speaks in the context of her work with artists who face repres74 -
sive regimes, which most likely informs her opinion that politicization through art happens in 
situations of oppression, it is unclear whether she views legalism as a form of depoliticization as 
well. 
 In the case studies which follow, I root my analyses in international human rights legal 
norms in order to emphasize the legal dynamics of each human rights scenario which are insuffi-
cient and limited. While I give some attention to the aesthetic and methodological dimensions of 
each project, it is important to recognize that these descriptions are not exhaustive. Ultimately 
this research sits at the intersection of multiple disciplines—art, law, political philosophy, and 
sociology—and therefore, while I aim to do justice to the concerns of all these disciplines, I am 
limited by the scope of my questions. I argue, however, that the interdisciplinary nature of this 
 Interview Sept. 25, 2018.72
 Ibid. 73
 Bishop, Artificial Hells, p. 874
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research does not weaken its applicability in human rights contexts. Rather, I posit that the inter-
sectional approach of this study lends a certain durability to the critiques and conclusions here, in 
comparison to human rights research projects which take one singular lens.  
 As I mentioned in the previous section, the projects I analyze do not always fall under 
traditional notions of socially engaged art—Ai Weiwei’s work, for example, complicates certain 
definitions of socially engaged art, and I address this in an analysis of Good Fences Make Good 
Neighbors. The definition of socially engaged art used in this research is quite expansive, and 
therefore is open to criticism. To reiterate my criteria in the case studies below I consider projects 
which demonstrate 1) a component of collectivity and participation, 2) an emphasis on process 
rather than an emphasis on product, and 3) an engagement with one or multiple human rights is-
sues.  
 Bishop characterizes socially engaged art as that art which aims “to place pressure on 
conventional modes of artistic production and consumption under capitalism,” while Kester rec-
ognizes participation as a form of praxis.   These scholars inspire my first and second criteria.I 75
recognize that not all socially engaged art work engages with human rights issues, but because I 
argue that socially engaged art can do human rights work both methodologically and thematical-
ly, I specifically analyze projects which encompass this third dimension as well. The projects 
chosen for this study have each been intentionally selected due to the human rights issues they 
focus on, the relevance of their work in this particular global political moment, and the unique-
ness of their methodology and processes. I take on these case studies with the understanding that 
 Bishop, Artificial Hells, p.2 ; Kester, The One and the Many, p.975
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the value each study has is rooted in its particular points of entry to the questions this research 
poses.  
CASE STUDIES 
I. Thomas Hirschhorn’s Gramsci Monument 
 “The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to an    
 adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, clothing   
 and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions. The States Parties   
 will take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right, recognizing to this effect  
 the essential importance of international cooperation based on free consent.”  
 -International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Article 11(1). 
 
Figure1.1 Gramsci Monument.  
Available at www.awp. diary.org/ gramsci- monument/ index.htm 
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 In 2013, Thomas Hirschhorn initiated his fourth and final project in a series of art works 
dedicated to philosophers. Preceded by projects focusing on the lives and works of philosophers 
from Spinoza to Deleuze, Gramsci Monument took place in a housing project neighborhood  
“located in the poorest congressional district in the nation and devastated by high unemployment  
rates, drugs, arson, and failed urban policies”—-The Forest Houses of South Bronx.  76
I begin my analysis of the Gramsci Monument by introducing the project, considering its themat-
ic and aesthetic components, and by describing the community and space in which it took  
place. I follow this with a close look at the human rights issues articulated in participant encoun-
ters, revisiting both the thematic and aesthetic dimensions of the project. 
Introduction to The Gramsci Monument 
 Gramsci Monument was inspired by the life and works of Antoni Gramsci (1891–1937), 
the Italian political philosopher and theorist known best for his Prison Notebooks. Sponsored by  
Dia Art, Hirschhorn’s project included: 
 a daily program of lectures by philosopher Marcus Steinweg, a children's     
 workshop run by artist Lex Brown, a radio station, happy hour, and a daily newspaper.   
 Weekly programs include a play titled Gramsci Theater, Gramsci Seminars led by   
 international scholars, Poetry Lectures and Workshops led by poets and writers, Art   
 Workshops led by Hirschhorn, open microphone events coordinated by the community,   
 and field trips organized by the project’s “ambassador,” Dia curator, Yasmil Raymond.  77
Gramsci Monument is an amalgam of projects, mediums, and encounters. Through these encoun-
ters I analyze, I argue that Gramsci Monument reveals flaws in the legalism which encompass 
 Glenn Ligon.“Thomas is a Trip”Artforum. November 2013. p. 22876
 “Thomas Hirschhorn: Gramsci Monument” Dia Art, Accessed October 1, 2018 https://www.diaart.org/77
program/exhibitions-projects/thomas-hirschhorn-gramsci-monument-project .
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the human rights issues of Forest Houses residents and that Gramsci Monument is itself a nonle-
gal human rights project.  
  
Figure 1.2 Gramsci Monument 
Available at www.awp.diaart.org/gramsci-monument/index.htm 
 Architecturally, “The Gramsci Monument bucks the laws of public space and aesthetic 
experience alike, operating simultaneously as architecture and art, exception and rule.”  78
Through this radical reinvention of a public space, residents were able to reimagine and reject 
“expectations of what designed space is supposed to look like in favor of a radically pragmatic 
functionalism.”  This functionally designed space allowed the encounters of the project to come 79
 Julian Rose, “Building Complex,” Artforum. November 2013. P. 23578
 Ibid. p. 23779
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to the forefront, redefining traditional notions of aesthetics to include relations and encounters, 
not simply visual components.  Also of key importance to the project was the programmatic as80 -
pect, which complimented the architectural design of the work. The methods of the Gramsci 
Monument—the deliberate but also organically collective activities and encounters—provided 
the opportunity for participants to confront the isolating effects of legalism which shape the reali-
ties of their human rights subjectivity.  
 From its origins, the Gramsci Monument embodied a sensitive approach to the history 
and dynamics of the Forest Houses community—it was not Hirschhorn who deemed the Forest 
Houses the site of his project, but the residents themselves. Hirschhorn explains that: 
 the decision about the location obviously comes from the residents—it can’t come from   
 me, from architectural purposes, or from geographical reasons. The residents are the ones 
 who invite me, who agree with me and accept helping me do my work, here, in their   
 neighborhood, on their grounds.  81
The collective, participatory nature of this project would not have been possible without the invi-
tation of the Forest Houses residents. I contend that their enthusiastic involvement is a rich 
source of Gramsci Monument’s political power as a nonlegal human rights project. Furthermore, 
the low-tech nature of this project does not diminish its value or integrity as art, but rather, I ar-
gue, makes organic collectivity and participation more possible by rejecting any exclusivity 
which  “high art” can affect.  82
 Scholars such as Claire Bishop (2004), Grant Kester (2011), and Nicolas Bourriaud (1998) have written 80
on “relational aesthetics” which encompasses this idea of aesthetics and encounters.
 Thomas Hirschhorn, “Gramsci Monument,” Rethinking Marxism, 27:2, (2015) 213-240. p 226.81
 Although Claire Bishop distinguishes between “aesthetic” projects which are “provocative,” “uncom82 -
fortable”, and “multilayered,” and low tech, activist projects which are “predictable,” “benevolent,” and 
“ineffectual,” (Artforum, 2004), Grant Kester disagrees. Kester argues for a challenge to the “limits of 
discursive systems,” such as those surrounding art, and particularly socially engaged art (Artforum, 
2006).
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 The low-tech nature of Gramsci Monument allows it to resist “aesthetic 
commonplaces.”  Furthermore, I argue that the interactive encounters Gramsci Monument  83
Figure 1.3 Children’s Class by Lex Brown  
Available at www.awp.diaart.org/gramsci-monument/index.htm 
facilitated in its space are aesthetic components as well. Ranciere asserts that “politics is an aes-
thetic affair since it is about what is seen and what can be said about it.”  Ranciere’s use of the 84
term “politics” here I apply broadly to the aesthetic, relational elements of Gramsci Monument to 
include the act of structuring and distributing power (over determining what is and is not “art” 
 Ara Merjian, “Thomas Hirschhorn” Frieze. November 18, 2013, https://frieze.com/article/thomas-83
hirschhorn-0 
 Ranciere, “Afterword”  p. 283. 84
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and what can be said about art). Encounters facilitated by Gramsci Monument redistribute power 
as participants collaborate in determining what is and is not “art” and what can be said about art. 
 On the relationship between art and politics, Ranciere writes,“Art—as it shapes common 
spaces or singular times, as it changes the coordinates of the visible or the ways of making sense 
of it, as it changes the relationships of the part and the whole or the singular and the anony-
mous—produces a politics of its own.”  However, he is careful to note that there can never be a 85
“plain” relationship between art and politics: “aesthetics has its own politics, just as politics has 
its own aesthetics. But this politics cannot be enclosed in a simple cause/effect relation.”  These 86
intricate connections between aesthetics, relationships, and politics is a thread throughout this 
research which I utilize to understand the various elements of what I have called “nonlegal hu-
man rights projects” such as socially engaged art.  
 Although Hirschhorn explains that “The Other has no specific ties with aesthetics,” the 
interactive and collective contemplation of Gramsci Monument allows participants to fragment 
notions of individuality and imagine new forms of relationships.  By allowing participants to 87
ponder the visual meaning of the work together, Hirschhorn’s project disrupts notions of artistic 
autonomy and enables an imagining of relational possibilities. This changing of “the relation-
ships of the part and the whole or the singular and the anonymous” is, as Ranciere would   
 
 Ibid. 85
 Ranciere, “Afterword” p. 285. 86
 Hirschhorn, “Gramsci Monument” p 226.87
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Figure 1.4 New York City Housing Authority  
Rendering of Forest Houses, circa 1950, ArtForum  
argue, productive in a political and an aesthetic manner.  It is through the creation of new con88 -
cepts of what is sayable or thinkable and how that Gramsci Monument is aesthetic.This aesthetic 
component of Gramsci Monument, I argue, directly confronts notions of liberal individualism 
embodied in human rights legalism. By conducting relational encounters between participants, 
and therefore producing new ways of elaborating on the visual meaning of an art work (as a col-
lective as opposed to individuals), Gramsci Monument’s aesthetic dimension challenges the 
modern, liberal dominance of individualism.  
 Ranciere, “Afterword” P. 285. 88
!  of !39 90
The Forest Houses: 
 The Forest Houses, where the Gramsci Monument took place, were established through a 
1949 Housing Act to create suitable living for working-class families. However, a decade after 
completion, the region where Forest Houses are located in the Bronx “was one of the poorest and 
most dilapidated areas of the city.”  Today, a basic news search reveals a continuation of this 89
degradation with an emphasis on crime and unhealthy living conditions due to neglect by the 
New York City Housing Authority (NYCHA). 
  As many subjects of human rights are, the residents of the Forest Houses are narrativized 
as apolitical human rights victims—a narrative this analysis seeks to understand and critique. I 
find Ranciere’s reflections on human rights salient here. In an analysis of Arendt’s concept of 
“the rights of man,” he explains:  
 …the political space, which was shaped in the very gap between the abstract literalness   
 of the rights and the polemic about their verification, turns out to diminish more and more 
 every day. Ultimately, those rights appear actually empty. They seem to be of no use. And 
 when they are of no use, you do the same as charitable persons do with their old clothes.   
 You give them to the poor…the Rights of Man become the rights of those who have no   
 rights, the rights of bare human beings subjected to inhuman repression and inhuman   
 conditions of existence.  90
In Arendtian terms, Ranciere explains that the rights of those who live in poor conditions, who 
are the subjects of repression, are the rights of those who have no rights, or at least rights which 
 Luisa Valle, “Thomas Hirschhorn’s Gramsci Monument: Negotiating Monumentality with Instability 89
and Everyday Life,” Buildings & Landscapes: Journal of the Vernacular Architecture Forum, Vol. 22 No. 
2. (2015): p. 23
 Ranciere, “Who is” P. 307.90
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are empty. These human rights, according to Ranciere, are the rights of the “unpoliticized 
person,” who is unable to actualize them.   91
 The introductory reference in this section suggests that the human rights realities of For-
est Houses residents can be reduced to the right to housing and that Hirschhorn’s Gramsci Mon-
ument addresses this issue. This would be a gross generalization and oversimplification of 
Hirschhorn’s work and the lived realities of the Forest Houses residents. The article quoted ini-
tially in this case study is one of the tools many human rights advocates might use to form a legal 
argument of human rights violations for “victims” like the residents of the Forest Houses. Yet, it 
misses the mark so profoundly in fully capturing the human rights realities of residents. The dy-
namics of this project and of the human rights realities of residents require reflecting on systemic 
neglect of the progressive realization of socioeconomic rights (through non-discrimination) and a 
historical perspective on this neglect in the Forest Houses community.  Even then, in attempting 92
to prove state failures to take steps to realize the right to housing without discrimination, so 
many factors—systemic racism, low employment rates, low income, inadequate access to equal 
education, and historical victimization—cannot be encompassed by a legal argument for change.  
 The situations of community members living in the Forest Houses can be connected to 
multiple human rights issues which are protected against or articulated in part by international 
human rights legal mechanisms—for example, the right to adequate housing, the progressive re-
alization of socioeconomic rights through government steps and nondiscrimination, and the 
 Ranciere, “Who is” P. 302.91
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. “General Comment No. 3: The nature of States 92
parties obligations.” 1990. 
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right to live free from racial discrimination.  Yet, the legal formalism of these rights does little 93
to positively improve or shape the enjoyment of these rights by residents of the Forest Houses.  94
 Critics of Hirschhorn’s project argue that the surface-level engagement with Gramsci’s 
philosophy led to a “reduction of Gramsci to sloganeering…in that it fails to engage, for or 
against in any meaningful way, with the profound if not profoundly unsettling ideas that Gramsci 
put forward.”  A critical perspective of Gramsci Monument could also take into consideration 95
the politics of Hirschhorn as an artist and the location of his project: as an educated European 
bringing to a marginalized and systemically oppressed community the philosophy of an historic 
European figure, Hirschhorn possessed a power over the project which the participants, by virtue 
of their political identities, did not. Yet, in taking control over the project—by employing resi-
dents from the community to construct the structures, by contributing to the daily logistics of 
running Gramsci Monument’s programs—“The Gramsci Monument has not radicalized the resi-
dents of Forest Houses. The residents of Forest Houses have domesticated the Gramsci Monu-
ment.”   96
 However, many residents of Forest Houses pushed back against Hirschhorn’s project, and 
Hirschhorn himself claims some autonomy in the project. He writes, “I am entirely and com-
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights article 11(1), General Comment 13 by 93
the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the Convention on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Racial Discrimination article 2(1) respectively. These conventions and general comments oper-
ate as international human rights law according to state practice and opinio juris. 
 Litigation against the NYCHA, for example, has been unsuccessful in creating community-wide, last94 -
ing change.
 James Panero, ”The Artist is Present in the Bronx,” New Criterion, September 2013, http://go.gale95 -
group.com/ps/i.do?p=BIC&u=columbiau&id=GALE%7CA343947217&v=2.1&it=r&sid=summon
 Ibid.96
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pletely the author, regarding everything about my work.”  I recognize the conflicting elements 97
here, but point out also the idea of “unshared authorship” Hirschhorn posits to resolve these ten-
sions. He explains, “But I am not the only author! Because the Other, the one who also takes re-
sponsibility for the work, is—equally—the author.”  Although the dynamics of Gramsci Monu98 -
ment may not be perfectly collective or egalitarian, some residents of Forest Houses nuanced 
these characteristics of socially engaged art by taking ownership of the project in their own 
unique ways. Hirschhorn’s Gramsci Monument uses the space of the Forest Houses where resi-
dents’ human rights realities are lived to engineer an art project which, through its multi-func-
tionality, creates the opportunity for reflecting on these lived realities.  
The Gramsci Monument and Human Rights Work 
 Socially engaged art does not simply provoke thought about human rights. I argue that 
participating in a socially engaged art project such as the Gramsci Monument does human rights 
work—it critically challenges the limitations of legalism in human rights and positively advances 
certain social components, such as collectivity and politicization, which I argue are necessary for 
actualizing human rights. Regarding Hirschhorn’s Gramsci Monument, I focus on its instigations 
and facilitations of collectivity, politicization, and ambiguity.  
 In the context of Gramsci Monument, I echo Judith Butler who reminds us that collective 
resistance, in its ties to “responsabilization” (the ability to respond), acts in opposition the precar-
 Hirschhorn, “Gramsci Monument” p. 697
 Ibid.98
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ity embodied by the disenfranchised human rights subject.  Although Butler writes in the contest 99
of coordinated, collective action, certain insights translate to organic moments as well. The un-
scripted collective moments and encounters of the Gramsci Monument such as “groups taking to 
the stage to play hiphop, tributes to Trayvon Martin (the young black man killed by police in 
Florida)” for example, resonated as “genuinely popular gestures, suggestive of the ‘multiple sin-
gularities’ Hirschhorn’s work aims to evince.”  These “multiple singularities” are present in 100
Butler’s collective assembly as well: Butler is provoked by the notion of “we the people” and 
insists that collective assemblies (all of them) prompt the question: who is ‘the people’ really?  101
The nuanced collectivity of Gramsci Monument, filled with narrative multiplicity, allows the 
human rights subjects participating to act in opposition to the precarity they each experience. 
 The “unscripted” nature of the Gramsci Monument, was in many ways deliberate. 
Hirschhorn explains that, “My mission consists in creating the conditions for an encounter, dis-
cussing and finally convincing the Other of the sense and seriousness of the Gramsci 
Monument.”  Through organic collective activity, residents of Forest Houses resisted a domi102 -
nating structure of power and political order which manufactures and regulates precarious sub-
jectivity for communities such as the Forest Houses community. 
 The Gramsci Monument was also an opportunity for politicization for participants. Re-
turning to Arendt’s theorization of the “Rights of Man” is useful in understanding how human 
 Butler, Notes. p. 1599
 Merjia, “Thomas Hirschhorn”100
 Butler, Notes.101
 Hirschhorn “Gramsci Monument”. p. 224.102
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rights exist for those who, in fact, have no rights.  Human rights for Arendt, according to 103
Ranciere, “were the paradoxical rights of the private, poor, unpoliticized individual.”  Recog104 -
nizing this characterization of the subjects of human rights, I argue that reclaiming power over 
that subjectivity—through encounters with the “Other,” through creating new possible actions 
and relationships, and through resisting regulatory techniques of power —makes political again 
those who have been depoliticized. These means of reclaiming power over subjectivity reflect 
Foucault’s notions of governmentality and subject formation.  As universal, suffering, apoliti105 -
cal subjects begin to oppose actions of liberal governmentality through encounters, creation and 
resistance, they engage in a social struggle against institutional subject formation which limits 
human rights work.  
 Crucial to the meaning of Gramsci Monument is its temporality: what does a temporary, 
ephemeral project such as the Gramsci Monument teach us about the value of the temporal am-
biguity of resistance? In the first paragraph of this section, I reference the “ambiguity” the Gram-
sci Monument embodies. By this, I mean “The multivalent, porous, and ambiguous nature of 
Hirschhorn’s project,” which “produced numerous points of entry and trajectories that did not 
lead to predetermined outcomes.”  As art which allowed and facilitated form of resistance—to 106
systemic oppression, to limited or inadequate human rights norms, etc.— the Gramsci Monument 
remained ambiguous about its ends. Esmeir explains that, “Rebellious action…is unclear about 
 Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1951), 297-298.103
 Ranciere, “Who is?”. p. 298. 104
 Foucault, “Power”105
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its future…revolutionary temporality is nevertheless distinct from the linear temporality of the 
international, as it entails a radical break from the present, introducing perils, liabilities, and un-
foreseen possibilities.”  As an ephemeral project, Gramsci Monument remained ambiguous 107
about its ends. I argue that this ambiguity is not present in legalistic human rights projects, and—
according to Esmeir— this severely limits radical potential for human rights change. 
 Human rights law is in many ways attached to time—when one considers the idea of pro-
gressive realization, for example, or even simply the notion of customary law (law which has 
been formalized through a past tradition of international jurisprudence and opinio juris), it is 
clear that human rights law is fixed on a linear temporal plane with goals to achieve specific 
ends. Though this formula is certainly necessary for advocacy and progress, it is deficient be-
cause it leaves little room for forms of social activism and human rights work which operate in 
nonlinear temporal modes. For example, many human rights movements in the United States 
have progressed in a pendulum-like character: with waves of progress and waves of regress in 
succession.  A project like the Gramsci Monument which is temporary, is a human rights 108
project because it reflects on and counters the deficiencies of linear temporal objectives visible in 
human rights legalism.  
 I have described how Thomas Hirschhorn’s Gramsci Monument does human rights work, 
both aesthetically and socially, problematizing the legalism associated with the human rights re-
alities of the Forest Houses community. By creating space for collectivity, politicization, and 
 Esmeir, “In the Land of the International” P. 364.107
 For example, consider the Civil Rights Movement and, later, the rise of the Black Lives Matter move108 -
ment which, though different than the Civil Rights Movement in various ways, is concerned with many of 
the same issues. 
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ambiguity, Gramsci Monument brought to light certain inadequacies in human rights legalism. 
Specifically, this project demonstrated the inability of legal human rights projects to capture the 
realities of many human rights subjects.Whether or not these outcomes were sources of motiva-
tion for Gramsci Monument I cannot say. However, the impact of the work is telling nonetheless. 
Now I turn to a socially engaged art project centering on Flint, Michigan, and the human rights 
situations for the residents of Flint in the wake of their water crisis. 
II. Mel Chin’s and Tracy Reese’s Flint Fit 
“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of 
the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health.” -International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Article 12(1). 
“all peoples, whatever their stage of development  and  their  social  and  economic  conditions,  
have  the  right  to  have  access  to drinking water in quantities and of a quality to meet their ba-
sic needs.” -United Nations Water Conference, Mar del Plata. 1977. 
 In contrast to Hirschhorn’s Gramsci Monument, Mel Chin’s and Tracy Reese’s Flint Fit is 
an example of a socially engaged artwork which more overtly has a thematic interest in specific 
human rights issues. In the artist’s words:  
 Flint Fit is an artist’s idea to transform empty plastic bottles from residents of Flint,   
 Michigan into a hopeful possibility. As the water crisis extends into its fourth year, and   
 citizens of Flint must still use bottled water for drinking, cooking, and washing, this   
 process aims to show that empty bottles can become vessels of hope rather than    
 reminders of an unjust crisis.  109
Although some may claim that deeming Flint Fit a “socially engaged” art work is generous, or 
perhaps misled, I highlight the ways in which its aesthetic and social dimensions situate it firmly 
 “Flint Fit,” Flint Fit, accessed October 11, 2018. http://www.flint-fit.com 109
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within a broad category of “socially engaged art.” As with the Gramsci Monument, I analyze 
Flint Fit by first sketching out the logistics of the project, the human rights issues addressed by/ 
at play in the project, and finally by dissecting the social and aesthetic components of the project 
to reveal its critiques of human rights legalism and its potential as human rights work.  
 
Figure 2.1 Bottle collecting 
Available at www.flint-fit.org 
Introduction to Flint Fit: 
 Flint Fit is a collaborative work facilitated by Mel Chin and Tracy Reese in coordination 
with the residents of Flint, Michigan. The project itself involved the collection of 90,000 empty 
plastic water bottles—bottles accumulated by Flint residents who require a substitute for safe  
running water—, the transportation of these bottles to a facility in Greensboro, North Carolina to 
be “transformed into REPREVE yarn” to be woven and knitted into fabric, and then sewn into  
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garments by participants in a sewing program at St. Luke N.E.W. Life Center in Flint.  These 110
garments, designed by Michigan native, New York-based designer Tracy Reese, were displayed 
surrounding a map of New York City’s water supply system at Queens Museum.   111
Figure 2.2 Bottle processing 
Available at www.flint-fit.org 
  
 After a visit to the Flint Fit exhibit at Queens Museum, the aesthetic components of this 
project became clear to me. I concur with one museum patron and reviewer who described the 
exhibit: 
 The elegantly rough-hewn garments are on view in Queens in an installation that    
 encompasses the museum’s relief map of the New York City water-supply system created 
 for the 1939 World’s Fair. Over this map, Chin has installed a hanging sculpture, The   
 Water and the City Above (2018), which maps out the Flint River in relation to the city,   
 creating a parallelism that reminds us that, with bad governance and unchecked    
 Flint Fit, “Flint Fit"110
 The location of this exhibit—The Queens Museum—was also, perhaps fittingly, home to the United 111
Nations General Assembly from 1946-1950. 
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 exploitation, a catastrophe similar to Flint’s could happen anywhere—Flint’s problems   
 are ours, too. As modeled on mannequins scattered around this space, Reese’s designs   
 look ready to ship to your local department store, but they are prototypes that have not   
 been mass-produced.  112
The juxtaposition of these components which symbolize both destruction—the sculpture of Flint 
River—and hope—water resistant apparel created with the remnants of Flint’s water contamina-
tion—optically fragments the viewer’s understanding of the water crisis in Flint. In so doing, 
Flint Fit aesthetically raises new ways of perceiving resistance to government failures to ensure 
the right to water and the right to health. Kester, writing on aesthetics and artistic autonomy, ex-
plains:  
 the “work” of modern art can be understood less in terms of formal or stylistic change per 
 se, than as an ongoing struggle to identify, and then displace, normative conventions…It   
 is this procedure of distanciation and critique that constitutes the essential content of the   
 contemporary aesthetic.  113
There are, of course, many ways to perceive the aesthetic dimensions of Flint Fit. However, I 
point to the visual juxtaposition of dissonant symbols as one aesthetic element which profoundly 
alters established perceptions of a well-known crisis. In so doing, Flint Fit aesthetically raises 
new perceptions, allowing participants and viewers to act as creative subjects. This new creative 
subjectivity, as Yamin explained in the introduction to these case studies, is inherently opposi-
tional to reigning notions of power and subject formation.   114
Barry Schwabsky, “Lamentations and Arrivals, Mel Chin’s Social Surrealism.” The Nation, Aug. 2, 112
2018, accessed October 11, 2018. https://www.thenation.com/article/lamentations-and-revivals/ 
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Figure 2.3 Sewing garments 
Available at www.flint-fit.org  
 In addition to this visual juxtaposition of dissonant elements, I argue that the methodolo-
gy of Flint Fit—the collecting of bottles, the processing of those bottles into yarn, and the 
sewing of the garments—provided opportunities for collective action and politicization similar to 
methodologies of Gramsci Monument. The intention of the methodologies vary greatly, though. 
While Gramsci Monument was engaged in collective creation for a project which was ephemeral 
and ambiguous, Flint Fit sought collective action as a method to produce an end piece: the gar-
ments designed by Tracy Reese.  
 The differences in methodology for these two projects contributes to difference in aes-
thetics as well. Perhaps with an end goal in mind—the production of garments—participants in 
Flint Fit were less endowed with the freedom to collaboratively imagine the possibilities of the 
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project. This act of collaborating on meaning, as Ranciere reminds us, redistributes power, and in 
doing so is both a political and an aesthetic affair.  Therefore, Flint Fit does not carry this aes115 -
thetic promise which Gramsci Monument embodies.  
Figure 2.4 Flint Fit at Queens Museum 
Author photo 
 The decision by Chin and Reese to create garments and to place them on bodies also car-
ries aesthetic significance. In dressing bodies (mannequins) in attire created from symbols of de-
cay (bottles), Chin and Reese bring our attention from the literal “big picture” of Flint’s issues 
(portrayed by Chin’s models of the New York water system and Flint water system) back to a 
 Ranciere, “Afterword,” P 283115
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bio-level. Chin’s and Reese’s use of bio- symbols—bodies which symbolize life and a topo-
graphical model of land which represents the environment—caused me to problematize my  
understanding of the relationships between disaster, bare life, and rights as distant concepts. The 
bodies and natural elements symbolized in Flint Fit visually altered my perception of the Flint 
Water Crisis by positioning these components of nature or bios within a project thematically fo-
cused on rights, specifically the right to water. 
 Ranciere uses Agamben to articulate the ways in which human rights strip subjects down 
to bare life: 
 In a first step, his [Agamben’s ] argument relies on the Arendtian opposition of two lives,  
 an opposition predicated on the distinction between two Greek words: zoe, which means   
 ‘bare physiological life,’ and bios, which means ‘form of life’…In her [Arendt’s] view,   
 the Rights of Man and modern democracy rested on the confusion of those two lifes—  
 which ultimately meant the reduction of bios to sheer zoe. [emphasis by author]  116
In experiencing the exhibition of Flint Fit, I was reminded of this biological reduction which oc-
curs for human rights subjects. Flint Fit visually demonstrates that human rights are not legal 
rights, held at a safe distance from the reductionist technologies of bio-power. Rather, through 
the visual juxtaposition of biological symbols in a work thematically interested in actualizing 
human rights, human rights subjects see that rights are entitlements one possesses by virtue of 
being bare life.  If human rights are those rights we possess by virtue of being human, then it 117
follows that when we are our most human, our most “bare”—stripped of identitarian dimensions 
such as nationality, gender, sexuality, etc.—we should have human rights. However, Ranciere 
 Ranciere, “Who is?” P. 299.116
 Ranciere demonstrates the ways Agamben maps his notions of biopolitics onto Arendt’s “Rights of 117
Man” to articulate the ways in which “The Rights of Man make natural life appear as the source and the 
bearer of the rights” (2004, 300). In 
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reminds us that this reduction of subjects of human rights to bios can lead to “a suspension of 
politics.”  The presence of bodies, bare except for rain and water gear, is a reminder that it is, in 118
fact, when we are most “bare” and most human that we do not have rights at all. 
 Aesthetically, I have argued that Flint Fit’s visual juxtaposition of certain elements alters 
established perspectives on human rights and opens opportunities for a more complex analysis of 
the Flint Water Crisis and the right to water. By encouraging imaginings of alternative forms of 
resistance and by allowing viewers to conceptualize the ways in which disaster and rights inter-
sect to strip subjects down to “bare life” and, thus, to depoliticize them, Flint Fit does human 
rights work.  
Flint, Michigan:  
 To understand Flint Fit, some background on the participating community and the con-
text of the water crisis is essential. In Flint Michigan, “The impoverished community of 100,000, 
once a thriving manufacturing behemoth, drew national attention in 2015 when research revealed 
residents were exposed to dangerously high levels of lead in their running water.”  The com119 -
munity of Flint, recognizing their legal rights to water and to health, participated in multiple ma-
jor class action law suits which were eventually brought to the United States Supreme Court.  120
To date, Flint Water Class Action, the legal initiative led by a collective of U.S. law firms, has 
 Ranciere, “Who is?” P. 301.118
Sebastien Malo, “Flint Bottles Hope From Its Toxic Water Crisis,” Reuters, November 1, 2017, ac119 -
cessed October 11, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-water-flint/flint-bottles-hope-from-its-
toxic-water-crisis-idUSKBN1D15LN 
Lawrence Hurley,  “U.S. Supreme Court Allows Flint Water Contamination Law Suits.” Reuters, 120
March 19, 2017, accessed October 11, 2018. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-court-water/u-s-
supreme-court-allows-flint-water-contamination-lawsuits-idUSKBN1GV1RB
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filed four major class action lawsuits with over 4,000 household participants from Flint, Mi-
chigan.  Certain strides have been made, such as the replacement of water pipelines which may 121
have been the cause of contamination, but the residents of Flint, Michigan still do not have clean 
water.  122
Flint Fit and Human Rights Work:  
 Flint Fit and the Gramsci Monument are clearly thematically different, but the mediums 
and dynamics of each project differ as well. It is important to recognize, I argue, that Flint Fit (or 
Gramsci Monument or other works) not only raises concerns about human rights legalism the-
matically, but that the methodologies of the projects themselves do human rights work as well. 
Here, I highlight the ways in which Flint Fit does human rights work by 1) resisting the reduc-
tion of a movement for broad social reform to a legalistic movement for civil and political rights 
2) facilitating collective resistance to individualizing forms of power, and 3) taking remnants of 
destruction and decay and transforming them into symbols of hope, prosperity and opportunity.  
 Many advocacy projects and movements for the rights centered by Flint Fit—the right to 
water, the right to health, the right to an effective remedy, among others—operate within the con-
fines of human rights legalism. For example, Flint’s class action law suits attempt to secure these 
rights for Flint residents through litigation. However, in redirecting the narrative of the Flint wa-
ter crisis away from a narrow focus on specific legislation and towards a broader narrative which 
encompasses systemic neglect and oppression, Flint Fit is an act of refusal against the reduction-
 “Is the Water in Flint, Michigan, Making Your Family Sick?” Flint Water Class Action, accessed Oc121 -
tober 11, 2018. http://www.flintwaterclassaction.com 
 Ron Fonger, “Flint Says 90 Percent of Unexplored Water Lines Likely Won’t Need Replacement,” M 122
Live Media Group. Aug. 21, 2018, accessed October 11, 2018. https://www.mlive.com/news/flint/in-
dex.ssf/2018/08/90_of_remaining_flint_water_se.html 
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ist perspectives of human rights legalism.  In its visual representations of decay, in its employ123 -
ment of economically neglected Flint residents, and in many other ways, Flint Fit reveals the in-
tersectionality and the complexity of the Flint water crisis. This, in turn, resists reductionist ar-
ticulations by legalistic projects, recognizing that legal claims for human rights cannot always 
encompass the realities of a community or a situation entirely. 
 Although distinct from Gramsci Monument, Flint Fit similarly demonstrates the ways in 
which collective action can act as a form of human rights work. The encounters facilitated by 
Flint Fit, in many ways instigated relationships worth analyzing. In this vein, Bishop explains 
that, “If relational art produces human relations then the next logical question to ask is what 
types of relations are being produced, for whom and why?”  I argue that through facilitating 124
interactions among participants—between community members, water bottle collectors, seam-
stresses, and others—Flint Fit created a platform for participants to collaboratively define the 
meaning of the project and to act antagonistically toward technologies of power which individu-
alize and victimize them as human rights subjects. Putting Judith Butler’s theorizations of collec-
tive resistance in conversation with Nicolas Bourriaud’s assertion that “art is a state of 
encounter,” I posit that the collectivity of Flint Fit brought a component of resistance to the 
project which, through relational encounters and collaborative judgements of the project, op-
posed individualized, apolitical subjectivity produced through human rights legalism.   125
 Brown and Halley (2018)  argue for the importance of nonlegal projects which resist reductionist nar123 -
ratives.
Bishop, “Antagonism” P. 65. 124
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 For residents of Flint, Michigan, perhaps their needs and realities seem more black and 
white: there is an urgent, pervasive, and explicit need for clean water immediately. Counter to 
Gramsci Monument, I perceive Flint Fit’s value not so much in its graceful emphasis on systemic 
realities which legalism cannot capture, or its temporal ambiguity (a la Gramsci Monument). 
Rather, I find the unique relevance of Flint Fit can be found in its transformation of symbols of 
decay to trophies of hope and community. Through this physical and visual redistribution of the 
narrative of the Flint Water Crisis—from tragedy to hope—Flint Fit demonstrates how aesthet-
ics, and art in general, can very tangibly do work to reimagine human rights futures. The last 
cases I analyze will exemplify this work in their own particular ways as well.  
III. Pablo Helguera’s School of Panamerican Unrest 
 “The Purposes of the United Nations are: …(2) To develop friendly relations among   
 nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of   
 peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace.” - United   
 Nations Charter, Article 1 
  
 “All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely   
 determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural   
 development.” - International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 1 (1); and   
 the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Article 1 (1). 
 The right to self-determination is essentially, “the right of a people to determine its own 
destiny.”  Rooted in Article 1 of the UN Charter, the Convention on Civil and Political Rights, 126
and the Convention on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the right to self-determination is 
bound up in and has been mobilized by struggles against colonial powers and neocolonial expan-
 “Self-determination,” UNPO, accessed November 1, 2018,  https://www.unpo.org/article/4957 126
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sionist policies in the twenty-first century.  In the reflections on School of Panamerican Unrest 127
(School) which follow, I analyze the project through this lens of self-determination as a human 
right.  
 Self-determination, originally envisioned by the “Third World” as a shield against colo-
nialism and as a way to facilitate the progress of human rights, was largely disregarded by former 
colonial powers.  In other words, “Even as they grudgingly moved toward accepting some no128 -
tion of self-self-determination as a human right, colonial powers sought to limit its application to 
the narrowest possible sphere.”  Although enshrined in various international legal provisions, 129
the right to self-determination had no immediate, lived existence outside of these 
transcriptions.  While the 1970s were characterized by the creation of multiple sovereign states 130
which were formerly colonized, economically and politically, colonial power relations persisted, 
and the former “Third World” remained hindered from determining their own cultural and politi-
cal lives. 
 Panamericanism, as I argue, is a rejection of de facto neocolonialist subjectivity and an 
assertion of creative subjectivity which transcends the limitations of legalistic approaches to self-
determination. School is one non-legal human rights project which facilitates this. Some ques-
tions which shape my reflections on School are: how does the project of panamericanism exem-
 Luis Eslava, Michael Fakhri, and Vasuki Nesiah, Bandung, Global History, and International Law: 127
Critical Pasts and Pending Futures. (Cambridge University Press, 2017)
 Recognizing the problematics of the term “Third World” in certain spheres, I use it here because many 128
of the postcolonial theorists I cite on the right to self-determination use this term in their scholarship.
Bradley Simpson, “Self-Determination, Human Rights and the End of Empire in the 1970s,” Humani129 -
ty: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development. Vol 4, No. 2 (2013): 
239-260. p. 251.
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plify the right to self determination? How is School concerned with the right to self determina-
tion and a decolonial approach to human rights? How, aesthetically, does School allow human 
rights subjects to decolonize? Through an introduction to School, an analysis of “panamerican-
ism” and a meditation on its aesthetic dimensions, I reflect on how School, as a socially engaged 
art project, does human rights work. 
Introduction to School of Panamerican Unrest: 
 In 2013, Pablo Helguera traveled in a van from Alaska to Chile in search of local artists 
and activists along the way who were willing to engage in discussions on the idea of “panameri-
canism,” and artistic suppression and marginalization in that specific political moment. 
Helguera’s project uses the notion of unity derived from panamericanism to approach cross-cul-
tural and cross-national issues which American artists and communities face. The author writes: 
 I decided to organize a series of collective discussions in dozens of cities throughout the   
 Americas that would help local art communities understand their issues in relationship to   
 each other. Because I wanted to honor the Utopian notion of Panamericanism, the act of   
 flying from one capital to another seemed un Panamerican, aside from financially    
 impossible. So, I chose to drive the entirety of the Pan-American Highway, from Alaska   
 to Tierra del Fuego. I would travel with a collapsible schoolhouse in which I would show   
 videos and conduct events. Following each panel discussion, I would conduct a workshop 
 where we would create a collective statement that would be read in a civic ceremony.  131
School as a socially engaged art project is certainly unique, and like the other projects analyzed 
in this research, occupies a different space on a spectrum of socially engaged art. What makes  
School  socially engaged art in the context of this research is its collective encounters, its empha-
sis on process as well as product, and its rich aesthetic components.  
Pablo Helguera, “Searching for Panamerica,” Art on Paper, Vol. 12, No. 3 (2008): 56-73. p. 59-60. 131
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Figure 3.1 Carrying the Panamerican schoolhouse 
Available at www.creative-capital.org 
 First, a close look at School’s artistic mediums is important to build an understanding of 
its aesthetic work and its human rights work. Much like Gramsci Monument, School utilized pro-
cesses such as workshops, debates, and discussions to foster creativity. Grounding his work in 
the fundamental idea that art and politics are inherently intertwined, Helguera gathered local 
artists at many of his stops to glean from them the issues surrounding artistic life in their com-
munity, and to discuss the ways in which these issues are cross-culturally and cross- 
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Figure 3.2 Playing the Panamerican Anthem, written by Helguera 
Available at www.pablohelguera.net  
nationally common. Through dialogues which analyze connections between geographically and 
culturally distinct communities, School problematizes the notion of difference itself. Thus, in cri-
tiquing how difference between art communities from Anchorage to Tierra del Fuego (for exam-
ple) is codified, School challenges colonial distinctions between “the West and the Rest,” be-
tween the self and the other.  These processes, as a sort of “speech-act,” bring into being a 132
shared vision, demonstrating creative subjectivity which negates depoliticization of human rights 
narratives. 
 School was also, much like Gramsci Monument, ephemeral due to its mobility. The idea 
of a nomadic project such as School, I argue, challenges the concept that art as an institution is 
 Edward Said, Orientalism, (New York: Pantheon Books, 1979); Homi Bhabha, The Location of Cul132 -
ture, (London: Routledge, 1994)
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fixed. Once art is no longer seen as geographically static—confined to urban, cultural capitals 
where “high art” thrives—it is possible to notice and perceive art from peripheral locations: po-
litically, socially, and geographically. In transporting a symbol of artistic and educational institu-
tions (the panamerican school house) to marginalized or ignored communities of the americas, 
School demonstrates the flaws of all types of institutions which exclude, marginalize, and op-
press based on political, or social sublaternaeity.  Throughout this research, I have argued that 133
legalism, as rooted in institutional technologies of power, is inaccessible for many human rights 
subjects. Therefore, I also see School’s institutional critiques as an opportunity for human rights 
subjects to act creatively and to ameliorate the exclusivist effects of legalism in human rights.  
 Despite Helguera’s institutional critiques, his quest remarkably mirrors colonial travel 
narratives which made profound contributions to the subjugation of the communities and artists 
Helguera seeks to illuminate and mobilize. Yet in directing “his focus to the periphery of the art 
field,” Helguera rejects the homogenizing and destructive work of colonial travel narratives, and 
instigates constructive dialogues on panamericanism.  Aesthetically, I argue that School 134
demonstrates a decolonial aesthetics which supports its human rights work. Decolonial aesthet-
ics, “confronts its audiences with their quotidian realities, while exposing systemic inequalities,” 
and articulates “how coloniality shapes their daily existence.”  135
 Spivak’s answer to her question “Can the Subaltern Speak?” (1985) is prescient here: she argues that 133
the subaltern cannot speak, effectively, because they cannot be heard. In being “heard” through a project 
such as School which actively seeks their voice, perhaps the subaltern (“those removed from the lines of 
social mobility”) can speak (Spivak 2004, p. 531). 
 Adetty Perez de Miles, “Dialogic Encounters: The School of Panamerican Unrest,” (PhD Diss. Penn134 -
sylvania State University Graduate School of Visual Arts, 2011), p. 122
Juan Ramos, Sensing Decolonial Aesthetics in Latin American Arts, (University of Florida Press, 2018) 135
P 199. 
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 School is rooted in processes and mobility which challenge colonial constructions of the 
“self” and “other.” It is an example of decolonial aesthetics which exposes systemic oppression 
and the relationship of these systems to quotidian realities. These dimensions—process, mobility, 
and decolonial aesthetics— allow School to challenge necolonialist tones in human rights, 
specifically, School opposes neocolonialist relationships which suppress the right to self-deter-
mination. The engagement School has with narrating cultural identity roots this project in a cri-
tique of colonial legacy and the right to self-determination. Furthermore, School points to flaws 
in the institutional structures which human rights legalism rely on and creates possibilities for 
conferring legitimacy on identity, regardless of oppressive power structures in human rights 
work. It is that historical context, and the idea of panamericansim to which I now turn for a 
greater understanding of the human rights work School does. 
“Panamerica:” 
 Panamericanism, according to Pablo Helguera, lives: 
 at the intersection of two historic political/intellectual currents in the Americas: on the   
 one hand, the eighteenth-century ideals of continental democracy and freedom that   
 became the grounding principles of the likes of Jefferson and Bolivar; and on the other,   
 the expansionist desires of the United States.  136
Facilitated by trade partnerships, economic policies, and diplomatic interconnectedness, 
“panamericanism” represents not just a policy framework, but the utopian notion of a shared 
American identity.  The idea of panamericanism has been manifested through the creation of 137
 Helguera, “Searching.” P 60.136
 Joseph Tenebaum, The Road to Pan-Americanism. (New York: Committee for Inter-American Coop137 -
eration, 1941). 
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various regional human rights institutions and mechanisms such as the Organization of American 
States and the Inter American Commission for Human Rights, and has been articulated by politi-
cal figures and writers such as Thomas Jefferson, Simon Bolivar, and Jose Vasconselos. Howev-
er, panamericanism has remained a utopian ideal, not a tangible, achievable project. Even a pre-
liminary analysis of US-Latin American relations will reveal that relationships between the 
Northern states and Southern states of the Americas has been far from equal or unified. US 
hegemony in the Americas is evident by US military operations, foreign policy, and trade agree-
ments which have historically allowed for gross violations of the human rights of people living 
in south and central American countries.   138
 If panamericanism is ideologically committed to principles of “democracy and freedom 
that became the grounding principles of the likes of Jefferson and Bolivar” and also to “the ex-
pansionist desires of the United States,” then how can panamericanism be connected to the right 
to self determination and decolonial struggles? Based on Helguera’s conception of panamerica as 
“a portrait of collective voices,” and School as existing to create this portrait, I argue that the in-
clusiveness of this project legitimizes the cultural life and existence of panamerican communities 
previously forced to the peripheries by nationalist narratives. Elaborating on legitimacy, differ-
ence, and artistic engagement, Perez de Miles writes: 
 Conferring legitimacy on a particular ideology or group of people and withholding it   
 from others exactly aligns with how difference is codified in everyday life to rationalize   
 elitism, abuse of power, and structural and systemic oppression (Bhabha, 1994; Fanon,   
 1968; Said, 1979; Spivak, 1988).  139
 Liliana Oboregón, “Latin America during the Bandung Era: Anti-Imperialist Movements vs. Anti-138
Communist States,” In Bandung, Global History, and International Law. Ed. by Luis Eslava, Michael 
Fakhri, and Vasuki Nesiah. (Cambridge University Press: 2017) P. 232-246.
 Perez de Miles, “Dialogic Encounters” p. 119139
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By re-stratifying “legitimate” and “illegitimate” voices through the inclusion of communities 
throughout North, Central, and South America, School reconstructs participants from subjects of 
difference to creative subjects, able to “act on the world” as Professor Yamin says, able to “freely 
determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural develop-
ment.”   140
 Legalism, as I have argued, is a discourse which legitimizes legal movements for change 
which are accessible only to a governing class, and deems illegitimate those movements which 
come from social peripheries, those non-legal projects. Therefore, even those legalistic struggles 
of American peoples for self-determination from colonial neighbors, in conferring legitimacy 
only on those moves which are legalistic, have systemically and historically delegitimized the 
voices of those American communities with which Helguera engages. Participants of School, 
through the marginalization and de-legitimization of their own art or social projects, have been 
disenfranchised of their right to have respect and protection of their particular ways of life—their 
self-determination. School, by encountering and engaging communities in political and social 
peripheries, supports a non-legal expression of self-determination. The greatest example of this 
work perhaps is Helguera’s choice to begin and end School with conversations with the last liv-
ing speakers of indigenous languages from Alaska and Chile.  141
 In attempting to understand and support a modern panamericanism by connecting the in-
tersectional issues communities throughout the americas face, Helguera’s School challenges 
colonial frameworks to human rights which dictate difference between American peoples. By 
 Informal conversation with the author, July 17, 2018, ; ICCPR and ICESCR (1966).140
 Helguera, “Searching” p. 60.141
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connecting North American and South American communities and effectively leveling power by 
creating a mutual vision of their relationships through panamericanism, School challenges colo-
nial subjectivities of the youth, cultivating the potential for creative subjectivity through partici-
pation. This relationship between decolonization and human rights is a fundamental principle of 
self-determination, and is central to the human rights work of School which I elaborate on below. 
School of Panamerican Unrest and Human Rights Work: 
 As many postcolonial scholars have argued, human rights today are contingent upon de-
colonization and resistance to imperialism.  Thus, if the formulation and facilitation of creative 142
subjectivity can counter colonial subjectivity, effectively, this work also does human rights work. 
Spivak, in fact, argues for a pedagogy for subaltern, rural poor (colonial subjects) as a “weapon” 
against imperialism and for the advancement of human rights when supplemented with 
activism.  If, Spivak argues, the ethical imagination of the subaltern colonial subject is ignored 143
by the human rights corpus or international agenda, they will remain objects of human rights 
“benevolence” and not creative subjects participating in human rights.  Spivak’s argument es144 -
tablishes a distinct relationship between creative subjectivity, decolonization, and human rights 
work.  
 Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, “Righting Wrongs,” The South Atlantic Quarterly, Volume 103, Number 142
2/3 (2004); Antony Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law. (Cambridge 
University Press: 2004)
 Spivak, “Righting Wrongs.” P. 554, 548. 143
 Spivak, “Righting Wrongs” p. 550. 144
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Figure 3.3 A panel captured in Helguera’s documentary of School 
Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=BkxGXq-JyVk  
 School is rooted in collectivity and processes which politicize the participant, therefore it 
acts to counter individualizing, apolitical subject formation which can occur through human 
rights legalism. In this way, it does human rights work, yet it is not overtly concerned with a 
thematic human rights issue as Flint Fit is, for example. However, I argue that the rich and tu-
multuous history of colonization and human rights in the Americas is featured prominently in 
this project. School’s creative subject formation, demonstrated by its processes such as panels, 
workshops, and collective writing, roots this project in a critique of colonial legacy and the right 
to self-determination. Furthermore, School points to flaws in the institutional structures which 
human rights legalism which rely on and create possibilities for conferring legitimacy on identi-
ty. 
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IV. Ai Weiwei’s Good Fences Make Good Neighbors 
 “Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from persecution.” 
 -Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14 
 “No contracting state shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner    
 whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on 
 account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or   
 political opinion.” -1951 Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees,   
 Article 33 
Introduction to Good Fences Make Good Neighbors 
 In 2017, Ai Wewei installed over 300 separate art exhibits throughout New York City’s 
boroughs in various public locations from Washington Square Park to bus shelters in Queens. 
Good Fences Make Good Neighbors (Good Fences), due to its overt interest in the global 
refugee crisis, is uniquely linked to the human rights of refugees and state accountability in the 
protection and fulfillment of these rights. Weiwei’s Good Fences demonstrates the artists philos-
ophy on the relationship between art and human rights: “My defense of human rights or freedom 
of speech is really related to the very essential core of the art practice.”  Through the lens of 145
refugee rights, I analyze how Good Fences, as a socially engaged art project, does human rights 
work. To do this, I look at the global refugee crisis to contextualize Weiwei’s project and to ad-
dress the legalism inherent to this crisis. I conclude with an analysis of the ways in which Good 
Fences functions as a non-legal human rights project. First, I turn Weiwei’s methodologies and 
look closely at the aesthetic dimensions of Good Fences. 
 Belinda Luscombe, “7 Questions: Ai Weiwei” TIME Magazine, October 12, 2017. 145
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 Figure 4.1 Gilded Cage 
Available at www.nytimes.com  
 As socially engaged art, Good Fences is unique from the other cases analyzed here. Al-
though it is public, and is therefore participatory (not necessarily in the creation of the works but 
in the experiencing of them—I elaborate on this in this section), it is nontraditional in that many 
of the works are finished products, and did not require collective collaboration to create. I argue 
that Good Fences is participatory because of the ways in which participating in the art alters the 
meaning and the effect of the art, and that this participation is a deeply aesthetic affair. For ex-
ample, from an outside perspective, “Gilded Cage” appears simply to be a bird cage, perched 
randomly in Central Park. If a participant enters “Gilded Cage” (as viewers are invited to do), 
suddenly the experience of being detained is visualized.  
!  of !69 90
 Figure 4.2 Gilded Cage  
Available at www.sculpturenature.com  
 “Arch” is another example of an artwork from Good Fences which, when a viewer partic-
ipates by walking through it, physically recreates the act of crossing a border. The artwork 
morphs from an image of a family or people standing together carved into an arch, to a simula-
tion of border-crossing. Art critics agree: 
 Ai Weiwei’s undertaking does in fact work. His steel cages and photographic images of   
 refugees possess genuine pathos. Moreover, they are capable of lasting in his audience’s   
 thoughts. ...In Washington Square Park, Ai Weiwei put up Arch (2017), a silver cage   
 whose overall shape mimics the shape of the vault it stands under; additionally, a    
 silhouette of two people forms a tunnel that has been cut into the cage. Lined with   
 stainless steel, it allows visitors to pass through the enclosure. As a re-enactment of the   
 refugee experience, it literalizes the event.  146
The fact that the meaning of the art changes with a viewer’s participation, I argue, allows me to 
view Good Fences through a socially engaged art lens. I recognize that the meaning of all art is 
contingent on each viewer’s perspective, and that this challenges my assertion of the unique par-
 Jonathan Goodman,“Ai Weiwei: Good Fences Make Good Neighbors,” Sculpture Nature, November 146
7, 2017. http://www.sculpturenature.com/en/ai-weiwei-good-fences-make-good-neighbors-new-york-pub-
lic-art/ 
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ticipatory dimension of Good Fences. However, the unique experiences this art affects—the ex-
perience of being detained or crossing borders, for example— make it relevant to my analysis on 
“human rights” socially engaged art works.  Good Fences, in defining “a new distribution of 147
the spaces of experience and of the sensory equipment that fits the topography of those spaces,” 
facilitates an aesthetic experience which politicizes the human rights realities of refugees.  148
 Aesthetically, Good Fences is unique because many of the pieces Weiwei contributed do 
not stand out, but blend in. What is the significance of art which is “very almost-art, but maybe, 
maybe not”?  Many of the smaller installations of Good Fences remain subtle additions to pre-149
existing New York City architecture. A New York Times reviewer remarks on the significance of 
these subtleties of Good Fences, writing, “Mr. Ai’s citywide checkpoints are a hundred muted 
bells that add up to a deafening alarm: We have accepted so many physical and political limits 
that new ones go unnoticed, and we may not protest our shrinking freedom until it’s too late.”   150
 “human rights socially engaged art” is a category which I frame and problematize on page 25.147
 Ranciere, “Afterword” P. 283148
 Ai Weiwei in “From China’s Artist-Activist, a Citywide Great Wall” Jason Farago, The New York 149
Times. Oct 12, 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/12/arts/design/ai-weiwei-artist-wall-fences.html 
 Farago, “a Citywide Great Wall”150
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 Figure 4.3 Arch 
Available at www.sculpturenature.com 
 But what of criticisms which deem some public art to lack an aesthetic robustness? It is 
one thing to categorize Good Fences as a political triumph, but another entirely to call it a politi-
cal and an artistic triumph. I posit, and scholars who reflect on Good Fences agree, that Weiwei’s 
innovative use of pre-existing structures to create art aesthetically alters the ways in which we 
view those structures we are accustomed to.  In doing so, Weiwei reproduces the act of seeing 151
something “old” anew—an act which he asserts is necessary to bring meaning and action to the 
global refugee crisis. 
  
 Luscombe, “7 Questions: Ai Weiwei” 151
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 Figure 4.4 Image of a refugee 
Available at www.sculpturenature.com 
  Regardless of what I perceive as the participatory nature of this project, I recog-
nize that many socially engaged art theorists might disagree with my categorization.  I argue, 152
nevertheless, for the importance of including Good Fences in this research—as a project by a 
highly recognizable artist on an issue particularly salient in this current political moment, Good 
Fences is a powerful example which might resonate with more readers than School, for example. 
I include Good Fences in an effort to make this research more readable for an even wider range 
of audiences. I turn now to the Global Refugee Crisis to contextualize Good Fences and to offer 
examples of the ways human rights legalism has been insufficient for refugees who are experi-
encing this crisis. 
 Claire Bishop, for example, has robust distinctions for participatory art which she explains “connotes 152
the involvement of many people and the ambiguities of “social engagement” (2012, 1)
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The Global Refugee Crisis 
 The works of Good Fences serve as a response to global political apathy for refugee 
rights following massive forced displacement globally from Syria, to Venezuela, to Myanmar 
and North Africa. In 2017, the forcibly displaced population of the world increased 2.9 billion, 
and by December, 68.5 million people had been forcibly displaced globally.  UNHCR defines 153
forced displacement as non-willful displacement due to “persecution, conflict or generalized vio-
lence.”  In 100 days alone, 655,500 refugees were displaced to Bangladesh from Myanmar.  154 155
Since the conflict in Syria began, 5.5 million Syrians are now refugees.  UN Conferences, 156
Summits and High Level meetings have occurred, a Global Compact with 23 objectives is being 
negotiated in December 2018, and yet, refugee and forced displacement statistics continue to 
grow at an alarming rate.  157
 All of the data on the Global Refugee Crisis included in this section derives from UN 
websites and platforms. This is done intentionally—since the start of the conflict in Syria which 
has come to represent the culmination of the Global Refugee Crisis, the international response 
has been largely through the work of NGOs and intergovernmental organizations, particularly the 
UN. As the de-facto shepherd of global responses to the refugee crisis, the UN has utilized tools 
 “Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2017,” UNHCHR, accessed November 1 p. 2 http://www.un153 -
hcr.org/en-us/statistics/unhcrstats/5b27be547/unhcr-global-trends-2017.html 
UNHCR, “Global Trends.” p.2154
 UNHCR, “Global Trends” p.3  155
 “Refugees,” United Nations, accessed November 1, 2018. https://www.un.org/en/sections/issues-156
depth/refugees/ 
“Global Compact for Migration,” United Nations, accessed November 1, 2018. https://refugeesmi157 -
grants.un.org/migration-compact 
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and mechanisms to which it always adheres: bureaucratic meetings steeped in the legalism of 
international human rights treaties and conventions.  Although UNHCR mobilizes peace-keep158 -
ing missions to provide and maintain refugee camps in areas like Kakuma (Kenya), Zaatari (Jor-
dan), and Yida (South Sudan), the majority of movements to fulfill the human rights of refugees 
have been through highly legalistic measures.  159
 The limitations of these legalistic measures can be contributed to what Esmeir calls the 
“peculiar hierarchy between rebellion and human rights.”  She mobilizes the image of the 160
refugee to explain her metaphor:  
 In fleeing and seeking refuge, refugees do not attempt to resolve the question of their   
 human status; European governments are more preoccupied with this matter. Rather, they 
 chart new routes for inhabiting a new part of the world, as they follow ancient routes of   
 migration and movement. These are the actions—not only rebellious actions—that   
 human rights declarations cannot capture.  161
Refugee rights, Esmeir argues, can never be fully articulated (and therefore protected or fulfilled) 
by current methods of human rights work—declarations, legal arguments, conventions, legalism. 
I do not argue that one socially engaged art project can solve the Global Refugee Crisis by any 
means. I do, however, assert that this non-legal approach to the refugee crisis, in its own way, 
does human rights work which legalism cannot.  
 See for example: the “New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants,” the “Global Compact for 158
Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration,” and the Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Com-
pact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. All available at https://refugeesmigrants.un.org/migration-
compact 
 “Inside the World’s 10 Largest Refugee Camps,” UNHCR, accessed November 1, 2018.  https://sto159 -
rymaps.esri.com/stories/2016/refugee-camps/ 
 Esmeir, “In the Land”  P. 362. 160
 Esmeir., “In the Land” P. 365. 161
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Figure 4.5 Circle Fence 
Available at www.nytimes.com  
Good Fences Make Good Neighbors and Human Rights Work 
 Through its visual elements, I argue that Good Fences resists the tendency of legalism to 
“pointedly and directly tie broad-based, locally and culturally rich ‘movement’ politics to de-
mands for state-enforced rights.”  Second, I assert that in resisting this reductionist narrative  162
common in legalism, Good Fences nuances, personalizes, and humanizes the refugee crisis in a 
way that legalistic methods cannot. 
 Good Fences resists reductionist legalistic perspectives on the refugee crisis by recogniz-
ing the complex motivations and diverse realities of refugees globally. Weiwei, in producing 
Good Fences, notes that: 
 the refugee crisis is a global crisis, it’s a human crisis…We cannot just say it’s a refugee   
 crisis. It’s not regional, it’s not just happening in the Middle East. It also happens in   
 Brown and Halley, Left Legalism, Left Critique p. 8162
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 Africa, in Bangladesh, in many, many other locations—caused by war but also caused by   
 environmental problems, famine, and the longtime lacking of support of education, and   
 birth control, all those issues, very complicated issues.  163
Weiwei’s exhibitions for Good Fences demonstrate this: projects such as “Gilded Cage” speak to 
the experience of detention, “Arch” meditates on the perils and hopes of border-crossing, and 
“Circle Fence,” encircling the Queens Unisphere, is a playful but also telling reminder of the ex-
perience of non-traversable boundaries. 
 These separate works which contribute to Good Fences visually offer endless meanings 
to a viewer who likely is familiar with the refugee crisis. Good Fences is, as I have argued, par-
ticipatory, but not in the same way as Helguera’s School, for example, yet both do human rights 
work. The fact that Weiwei’s projects are able to display hope and despair, play and detention, 
simultaneously gives a complexity to the refugee crisis which cannot exist in legalistic interpre-
tations. Visually, Good Fences does aesthetic work to capture the human rights realities of 
refugees. 
 Good Fences also does human rights work by facilitating daily encounters with the sub-
ject matter. By creating opportunities to engage with the global refugee crisis daily—for some 
New Yorkers, a daily commute could mean seeing Weiwei’s work at a bus stop twice per day—
Weiwei demonstrates another fallacy in human rights legalism. In placing importance on the 
many encounters New Yorkers had with his art through their daily activities, Good Fences speaks 
to the power of large collectives acting in small ways daily and opposes the self-proclaimed val-
ues of conventions, treaties, meetings and legalism. Resistance to the suppression of human 
Dail Eisenger, “Review: Ai Weiwei’s ‘Good Fences Make Good Neighbors’ Tests the Limits of Hu163 -
manity,” SPIN, October 23, 2017. https://www.spin.com/2017/10/ai-weiwei-good-fences-make-good-
neighbors-review/
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rights, as Good Fences reminds us, is not only done through formalized, legalistic methods, but 
also through quotidian encounters and collective recognition. This principle, articulated by 
scholars such as Judith Butler, bring me to complete these case studies with a return to the theo-
retical foundations of this research and concluding remarks on socially engaged art, legalism, 
and human rights.   164
IV. SECTION FOUR 
CONCLUSIONS 
 Initially, this project began with the goal to explore the ways in which socially engaged 
art did human rights work which legalistic projects could not. Through a critical engagement 
with relevant literature, and a careful analysis of four cases, this research has revealed not a pure 
confirmation of these hypotheses per se, but rather, a new way of approaching the initial ques-
tions—perhaps conclusions on the potential of socially engaged art to do human rights work are 
not the most important conclusions to make. Rather, it is the questions, critiques, and voids in 
legalism which (what I have called) human rights socially engaged art works illuminate that are 
most important to recognize. While it is clear that socially engaged art does human rights work 
through the various means I have elaborated on (particularly through collectivity and politiciza-
tion), the greatest project of this research is the critique of human rights legalism. Furthermore, 
in demonstrating what non-legal projects such as SEA can do for human rights, these case studies 
reveal the ways in which legalism is limited. I posit that while there is certainly value in theoriz-
ing possible futures and alternatives to that which is criticized, it is also crucial to specify flaws 
 Butler, Notes. 164
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in existing technologies and methodologies in order to instigate imaginations of alternative pos-
sibilities.  
 Throughout this project, I have argued that socially engaged art can do human rights 
work through various ways, two of which—collectivity and politicization—I reflect on here. 
First, as Judith Butler theorizes, acting collectively can be a form of resistance to dominant pow-
er structures.  Several of the projects analyzed here have demonstrated a collectivity which per165 -
formatively resist a dominant principle which dictates human rights work globally: human rights 
are endowed in individuals who are entitled to them as universal human rights subjects. Brown 
reminds us, however, that this fundamental concept in which all human rights are grounded in, is 
paradoxical. The very notion of liberal individual is a crippling hypocrisy: 
 And the paradox within this problem is this: the more highly specified rights are as rights  
 for women, the more likely they are to build that fence insofar as they are more likely to   
 encode a definition of women premised on our subordination in the transhistorical   
 discourse of liberal jurisprudence.   166
Recalling feminist critical theorists like Spivak and MacKinnon, Brown articulates the paradox 
of human rights: If you, as a suffering, individual subject of human rights, “have” human rights, 
you do not, in fact, have human rights. This, according to Brown, is a problem which “Foucault 
painted most masterfully in his formulation of the regulatory powers of identity and of rights 
based on identity.”  Collectivity, exemplified in socially engaged art, is one way to alleviate 167
this.  
 Butler. Notes.  165
 Brown, “Suffering” p 239.166
 Ibid. 167
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 Although collectivity is present in the majority of the projects I analyze, perhaps the 
greatest rejection of liberal individualism, the most profound opposition to identitarian politics, 
occurs in Flint Fit. Through the various layers of collectivity—group efforts to collect bottles 
and a collaborative initiative of seamstresses who sewed garments, for example—I argue that 
Flint Fit did two things: 1) it allowed for an understanding of rights which is rooted in relational-
ity and 2) it contributed to an intersectional vision of the Flint water crisis. Through the encoun-
ters it facilitated, Flint Fit supported an interconnected vision of the crisis which linked one per-
son’s actions to the life and actions of the community. Flint Fit reveals connections between cat-
astrophe and location but does not focus on identity as such. As bottle collectors gathered materi-
als, there was an opportunity to understand that task in relation to a broader project and in rela-
tion to the lives of other Flint residents. By creating new relationships, Flint Fit acted antagonis-
tically to the principle of identitarian individualism which is fundamental to human rights legal-
ism. 
 Furthermore, Flint Fit allowed participants to recognize the ways in which the crisis is 
not simply mechanical—its causes and impacts live at the intersections of public policy, race, 
socioeconomic status, and other categories. In building links between these previously isolated or 
ignored factors, Flint Fit demonstrates the flaws of singular, narrow perspectives on human 
rights. Through collectively elaborating on the ways that disasters and human rights intersect, 
participants of Flint Fit demonstrate the dangers of isolating human rights subjects and situa-
tions.  
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 Arendt and Ranciere, among other scholars, have argued that human rights, despite their 
ontological relationship to the liberal individual, are the rights of those who have no rights.  168
There is a philosophical conundrum innate to human rights—individuals supposedly are subjects 
of human rights, and yet, individually, these subjects have no rights. Collectivity challenges the 
assumption that the individual is the vehicle through which human rights can be actualized. Be-
cause international human rights legalism is deeply committed to liberal individualism, it can 
never fully internalize this critique, and therefore is limited in its potential to enact human rights 
for “those who have no rights.”  
 Second, I have argued that human rights legalism is a depoliticizing force which con-
structs subjects of human rights as entitled to human rights, yet apolitical. Marx, Arendt, 
Ranciere, and others have written elaborately on this paradox.   However, a brief article by 169
Wendy Brown sums up this problem adequately:  
 …even as invocations of rights for a particular subject (e.g., women) on a particular issue 
 (e.g., sexuality) in a particular domain (e.g., marriage), all of which have been historically 
 excluded from the purview of rights, may work to politicize the standing of those    
 subjects, issues, or domains, rights of liberalism also tend to depoliticize the conditions   
 they articulate. Rights function to articulate a need, a condition of lack or injury, that   
 cannot be fully redressed or transformed by rights, yet within existing political discourse   
 can be signified in no other way. Thus rights for the systematically subordinated tend to   
 rewrite injuries, inequalities, and impediments to freedom that are consequent to social   
 Arendt explains that “the Rights of Man are the rights of those who are only human beings, who have 168
no more property left than the property of being human. Put another way, they are the rights of those who 
have no rights, the mere derision of right.” (1951,  297-298). Ranciere expands on Arendt, arguing that 
“the Rights of Man… were the paradoxical rights of the private, poor, unpoliticized individual.” (2004, 
298)
 Karl Marx, “On the Jewish Question” in Marx: Early Political Writings, Ed. by Joseph O’Malley and 169
Richard Davis, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994.; Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitari-
anism, New York: Harcourt, 1951.; Ranciere, Jacques. “Who is?” 
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 stratification as matters of individual violations and rarely articulate or address the   
 conditions producing or tormenting that violation.   170
I quote Brown at length here because her words demonstrate my point so clearly: the human 
rights subject, by virtue of being subject to liberal human rights legal discourses, is depoliticized. 
 Socially engaged art, as I have argued, acts to ameliorate this. In particular, the case of 
Good Fences exemplifies politicization of human rights subjects who are highly depoliticized by 
legalistic narratives. Good Fences is a collection of monuments to the ways in which refugees act 
on the world to enact their human rights to life and to non-refoulement. “Arch” which mimics 
the act of crossing borders, “Gilded Cage” which makes tangible the experience of detention, and 
other works, all memorialize what it is like to traverse boundaries in order to secure human rights 
protections. Good Fences is a celebration of the ways in which refugees politicize themselves 
through breeching the limitations of human rights declarations, enacting by themselves, the hu-
man rights “actions—not only rebellious actions—that human rights declarations cannot 
capture.”  Good Fences, and other socially engaged art projects, demonstrate the potential of 171
non-legal human rights projects to politicize subjects of human rights. This politicization, then, 
aids in restoring control over the fulfillment and enjoyment of one’s own human rights. 
 Through this work and the body of theory which contributes to it, I have attempted to 
demonstrate the powerful and critical relationship between the political and the aesthetic dimen-
sions and how this relationship directly contributes to human rights work.  Through a combina-
tion of social work and aesthetic work, socially engaged art illuminates the limitations of the le-
galism which profoundly pervades human rights work, and supports human rights work in ways 
 Brown, “Suffering” p 431170
 Esmeir, “In the Land” p. 365.171
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which legalism cannot. Although the tools that socially engaged art provides are not limited to 
collectivity and politicization (other tools these projects highlight are ambiguity, institutional 
criticisms, and process-based activity), these have been the most prominent in all of the cases 
analyzed here.  
 Recognizing the limitations of legalism and also its “sacred cow” status for human rights 
projects leaves us with a frustrating conclusion. I am motivated by this particular project—a cri-
tique of legalism—due to my belief in the value of critique as a tool for imagining alternatives. 
Wendy Brown, writing in States of Injury, summarizes my perspective best:  
 If, as Marx argued 150 years ago, the democratizing force of rights discourse inheres in   
 its capacity to figure an ideal of equality among persons qua persons, regardless of   
 socially constructed and enforced particularities, then the political potency of rights lies   
 not in their concreteness, as Patricia Williams argues, but in their idealism  172
Perhaps although human rights legalism is limited and problematic, legal actions are necessary 
first steps to achieving a more robust class system critique and to achieving the “idealism” 
Brown writes about. I recognize that legalistic projects and some forms of socially engaged art 
alone cannot undo the capitalist, modern formations in which human rights are embedded. Yet, I 
find value in highlighting non legal projects such as socially engaged art which allow for new 
visions of subjectivity. Through the critiques of legalism I emphasize, I attempt to show the im-
plications of depoliticizing, liberal discourses on human rights. In my analyses of various social-
ly engaged art projects, I seek to show an amelioration of this depoliticization, and how this ame-
lioration can breech the limitations of legalism. 
 Wendy Brown, States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity, Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni172 -
versity Press, 1995. P. 134
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 I argue that in order for human rights to be enjoyed to the highest attainable standard, 
human rights subjects must be considered as political actors, able to pursue and secure the en-
joyment of their human rights. Any institution or technology of power which prevents this politi-
cization, in fact, does damage to human rights progress globally. The law—as I and other schol-
ars have pointed out—is limited in its abilities to politicize human rights subjects. Socially en-
gaged art, in contrast, embodies an aesthetic engagement with the politicization of identity, col-
lectivity, rebellion, and oppression. By politicizing one’s self through socially engaged art, hu-
man rights subjects can fracture suffering, apolitical subjectivities projected onto them by human 
rights legalism. In doing so, human rights subjects can critically, thoroughly, and openly engage 
in human rights discourses and work which was previously inaccessible or illegible. 
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